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Preface 
 
This evaluation was commissioned by the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) via 
the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS), which issued a request for proposals 
to eight organizations on September 2, 2004. On the basis of these proposals, the Geneva 
International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) was selected to conduct the 
evaluation. GICHD fielded a four member evaluation team, led by an independent consultant, 
to complete the assignment. 
 
The members of the evaluation team wish to express their appreciation for the cooperation of 
all individuals who have contributed their insights that lie at the root of our findings. We have 
discussed the unfolding of the UNMEE MACC story, its successes and its challenges, with 
people too numerous to be mentioned here. Nevertheless, Justin Brady of UNMAS deserves 
special recognition for generously helping us develop a basic understanding of the issues 
before travelling to Eritrea. Phil Lewis, UNMEE MACC Programme Manager in Asmara, 
spent much valuable time with us and always kept his door open to answer more questions. 
Gerhard Bechtold took pains to explain all the intricacies of information technology, Vankata 
Raman was helpful in many essential ways, and Andrea Poelling expertly arranged interviews 
and was able to track important data. Thank you all. 
 
Frans Anema    Team leader      
Johannes Dirscherl Mechanical specialist   
Ted Paterson  Evaluation manager and economist 
Phil Bean  IMAS specialist 
 
This report incorporates – as Annex 5 – the letter of response from the management of 
UNMAS. 
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The 30-year war between Ethiopia and Eritrea (1961-1991 war of independence from 
Ethiopia), as well as the border conflict between the two countries (1998-2000), left a legacy 
of serious mine and UXO contamination. As soon as a comprehensive peace agreement was 
signed in 2000, contributions poured in from donor countries including, among other things, 
much support to demining operations as a precursor to humanitarian assistance activities and 
development work.   
 
With the establishment of the UN Mission to Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) shortly after the 
cessation of hostilities, mine action commenced. Three countries (Slovak Republic, Kenya 
and Bangladesh) contributed demining assets and worked in collaboration with a civilian-run 
UN Mine Action Co-ordination Centre (MACC). The UNMEE MACC received its mandate 
from the Security Council in the form of three resolutions, certainly the first of which left 
much to individual interpretation. The interpretation by the MACC was a liberal one, leading 
to an extremely hectic pace of work during the first two years, involving mine action and 
institutional development activities. The first Security Council resolution called, among other 
things, for coordination of humanitarian mine action activities, a rather obscure concept that 
was not backed up by a formal agreement with the Government of Eritrea. Nor was it 
subjected to a strategic plan or a set of precisely defined terms of reference. It is clear from 
experience that considerable effort should be made to define the responsibilities of a MACC 
attached to a peacekeeping force with utmost clarity and precision, requiring active 
participation by UNMAS in the planning for peacekeeping missions. 
 
In spite of some very noteworthy achievements, including the virtual re-establishment of the 
National Training Centre and the training and equipping of three national demining teams 
under the former Eritrean Demining Agency (EDA-1)1, the MACC experienced a number of 
setbacks. Partly because of the vagueness of mandate, other competing demands, as well as a 
serious under-estimation of the challenges of issuing tasking orders, the MACC’s 
coordination function was not effective, an assessment corroborated by opinions of various 
respondents. Nor were the mine action capacity development activities undertaken by the 
MACC ultimately successful (in spite of effective mine clearance training activities), partly 
because a temporary mine action centre associated with the peacekeeping force is not always 
a natural conduit for this type of activity, and partly because there was a lack of clear national 
commitment and a precise, formally written and signed agreement at the highest level. In mid 
2002, the President of Eritrea issued a proclamation in which he announced the establishment 
of a national Eritrean Demining Authority (EDA). About a month later he announced the 
expulsion of international mine action NGOs, accusing them of being “all over the place”. In 
spite of some noteworthy progress in local mine action capacity building by the MACC 
during the first two years of the Mission, the establishment of EDA amounted to a virtual 
denial of achievements in this area. The President left the door open for the UNDP to start a 
mine action capacity building programme anew, now under different circumstances, and 
separate from the MACC. The proclamation thoroughly affected the operations and the 
mandate of the UNMEE MACC, limiting the latter to a focus on Force-support only. Many 
                                            
1 Not to be confused with the Government’s Eritrean Demining Authority (EDA) which was established 
as a consequence of Proclamation 123 in mid-2002, disbanding the existing Eritrean Mine Action 
Programme (EMAP). 
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donors withdrew funding support from the country, with the noticeable exception of the 
Dutch (some smaller contributions continued by the Canadians and the Norwegians). 
 
The UNMEE MACC lost no time in re-defining its mission and the management structure of 
its activities. It did so with competence and creativity. Of importance in this respect is the 
decision to integrate Peacekeeping Force demining capacity within a civilian-run MACC 
while preserving the final authority of the Force Commander in priority setting and tasking of 
the Force assets. This innovative approach, which can be replicated elsewhere under similar 
circumstances, earned the MACC a UN 21 award. 
 
While much useful work has been accomplished during the last two years, it is clear that the 
scope of activities of UNMEE MACC has diminished greatly compared to the period before 
the President’s Proclamation in July 2002. Especially with respect to mine action capacity 
building, MACC’s responsibilities have been confined to ad hoc support of the EDA upon 
request, except in the area of information technology and medical support where the MACC 
still plays an ongoing supportive role. In most other areas, the EDA now benefits from 
effective (but currently under-funded) UNDP assistance. It is important to mention that the 
relative success of the UNDP in this regard is partly due to the transfer of deminers and HQ 
staff trained by the MACC and NGOs to this new organization and its operating arm (EDO).  
 
Experience would suggest that national capacity development should start immediately after 
cessation of hostilities, but that capacity development support by an entity closely associated 
with peacekeeping forces is not automatically acceptable to local authorities and should be 
undertaken with great trepidation. Experience would also suggest that absolute clarity in roles 
of a MACC, especially roles lying outside traditional Force support functions, be established 
through an agreement at the highest level.  
 
With a scope of activities that is currently more confined than before, with access to both the 
assessed budgetary resources and the Voluntary Trust Fund, and with sufficient staff 
resources, the MACC could justifiably consider tasks that would logically complement 
current MACC responsibilities. Of interest in this respect is the objective of the Force 
Commander, in line with the broader objectives of the mission overall, to try to “win the 
hearts and minds of the local population”.2 Well-planned and well-defined demining activities 
in support of Force requirements and Force mobility, with significant secondary benefits for 
the local population, might play an important role in this respect. Such an approach seems 
especially viable when a Mission has moved from a state of emergency to a state of stability. 
In this respect, Force requirements should be reviewed on an agreed basis and time scale. 
 
Great success has been achieved in establishing an effective and efficient unit dealing with 
information technology. The Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) has 
proven to be a most powerful tool in Eritrean mine action, in spite of the fact that a number of 
serious challenges remain in establishing a fully viable system. Statistics and maps currently 
benefit all mine action activities in the nation. A number of IMSMA insufficiencies have been 
resolved with so-called “add-ons”, i.e. measures to provide required data the system cannot 
yet generate on its own. (Subsequent to our mission, most of these add-ons were removed 
after the installation of an updated version of IMSMA.) Certain operational improvements can 
be envisaged, including the need for significant simplification of the system.  
                                            
2 The distinction between the mandate of the Peacekeeping Force and that of the broader mission 
also should be recognised, and is discussed at greater length in the body of the report.  
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Some serious problems have been encountered in terms of efficiency and effectiveness of 
troop-contributing demining assets. Mechanical equipment turned out to be hugely 
inappropriate and excessive, not to speak of the formidable expenses involved. Productivity of 
the Slovak contingent was minimal, and the Slovak deminers plus their equipment were 
eventually replaced by commercial assets. A serious and dangerous absence of international 
mine action standards (IMAS) was observed in the operations of the Bangladeshi demining 
contingent, and only the Kenyan contingent appeared to have been properly trained to 
perform in an IMAS-compliant fashion. The Joint Assessment Mission will need to play a 
much more vital role in determining the right mix and type of demining assets right at the 
initial planning stage for a peacekeeping mission. It also seems clear that DPKO will need to 
institutionalise the authority and competence to negotiate with troop contributing countries to 
ensure the best contribution suited to circumstances. Military assets will need to be assessed 
prior to deployment, and arrangements should be made to review the use of the assets after 
one year (and periodically thereafter) in order to introduce possible adjustments. With respect 
to the application of international standards, training may need to be provided prior to 
deployment, and UNMAS may wish to quality assure existing regional training programmes 
for this purpose (in Kenya, Ukraine, and Benin). There is also scope for donors to contribute 
to training and equipment if necessary.  
 
In comparison to contingent assets, the introduction of commercial demining assets has turned 
out to be very cost-effective indeed. While a peacekeeping mission would likely wish to 
maintain contingent demining prowess (assuming some of the steps mentioned earlier are 
introduced to enhance performance), the use of complementary commercial assets3 right at the 
start of a mission should be seriously considered.  
 
A number of recommendations and lessons learned have been defined and appear in the 



















                                            
3 We use the term “commercial assets” to refer to demining assets contracted on commercial terms 
(usually via a competitive process) and not to distinguish between for-profit and not-for-profit 
organisations. We are making no assessment of the relative performance or capabilities of for-profit 
versus not-for-profit organisations in the demining field.  
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 
On December 12, 2000, Ethiopia and Eritrea signed a Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 
Algiers. It ended more than two years of serious border conflict that resulted in countless 
casualties and displaced people. A Temporary Security Zone (TSZ), 25 km wide and 1000 km 
long, now separates the two countries. The zone, located mostly on Eritrean soil, has a serious 
contamination of landmines and UXO. A UN Peacekeeping Force in excess of 4,000 troops 
was dispatched shortly after the agreement was signed. Unfortunately, there is no resolution 
yet with respect to the precise demarcation of the border, in spite of a short-lived agreement 
by both parties to abide by the recommendations of an independent border commission.  
 
With the arrival of the UN Peacekeeping Force, a mine action programme began. The 
programme received its mandate from the Security Council, Resolution 1320, and two 
subsequent resolutions. Perhaps the most important event during the last four years was the 
unexpected decision by the President of Eritrea to expel international non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) engaged in mine action, and to establish a new national mine action 
authority called the Eritrean Demining Authority (EDA). The decision abruptly stopped much 
demining activities in the TSZ, and drastically changed the scope of work for the MACC 
attached to the UN peacekeeping mission.    
 
After some four years of operations, it was felt useful to evaluate the mine action programme 
in order to learn from experiences gained. The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian 
Demining (GICHD) was selected by UNOPS/UNMAS to conduct the evaluation, and a team 
of evaluation and mine action specialists commenced work in October 2004. The team 
consisted of two technical experts with knowledge of mine action standards and mechanical 
demining techniques, one specialist in management and evaluation methodology (team 
leader), and one evaluation manager stationed in Geneva, who also conducted the economic 
analysis based principally on data obtained from UNMEE MACC.  
 
The goals of the evaluation were to (i) define the coordinating role of the programme through 
mid-2002; (ii) the optimal integration of peacekeeping force demining assets under a civilian-
run coordination centre; and (iii) provide a cost-benefit analysis of peacekeeping demining 
versus commercial demining. Further elaboration concerning these goals was provided 
through nine evaluation objectives and 21 evaluation issues. Given the breadth of the 
assignment and the budget constraints that emerged,4 GICHD recommended that the 
evaluation team focus on those issues most central to UNMAS and its current policy agenda. 
During the discussions in New York, UNMAS advised that the evaluation team, while not 
abandoning the first goal, should indeed focus on the second and third goals plus the specific 
objectives and evaluation issues associated with these goals. 
 
The first three members of the team spent a week in New York for discussions with staff of 
UNMAS, UNOPS, DPKO and others able to provide special insights. The team leader and the 
mechanical expert then travelled to Eritrea and spent close to three weeks meeting with staff 
of the mine action centre, members of UN specialised agencies, officials and representatives 
of donor countries. A major problem encountered was that the relevant representatives of the 
                                            
4 The budget for the exercise was reduced following the preparation of the Terms of Reference. As a 
result, GICHD was asked to reduce its cost proposal by about 25 per cent, which then necessitated a 
tighter focus for the evaluation. 
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Eritrean government did not make themselves available for meetings with the evaluation 
team, leaving a serious but unavoidable gap in the evidence-base from which to draw 
conclusions and recommendations. The mission team also observed demining operations in 
the field, and analysed numerous documents. The team did not travel to Ethiopia but 
concentrated its research on mine action in the TSZ and adjacent areas. In Europe, team 
members visited the Netherlands and Sweden for follow-up meetings with donor country 
representatives, and Bratislava to review the mandate and performance of the Slovak 
demining contingent.5  
 
In October 2004, shortly after its mission to Eritrea, the evaluation team also distributed 
questionnaires to the international NGOs active in Eritrea at the time of the expulsion order in 
August 2002. Cursory responses were received for the most part; the reason being that the 
officers most familiar with the events surrounding the expulsion had moved on in the 
intervening years. HALO Trust provided a lengthy response, but this arrived in early February 
2005, some weeks after the presentation and discussion of the findings, conclusions, and 
recommendations contained in the draft report6 with UNMAS and UNOPS in New York, and 
shortly after the draft final version of the report had been completed. 
 
The submission from HALO Trust raised some fundamental questions relating to the 
coordination role played by UNMEE MACC. In light of this, and despite the fact that this 
submission arrived so late in the process, UNMAS, UNOPS, and GICHD agreed that the draft 
final should be further revised to elaborate somewhat on the issues raised in the HALO 
submission. The Evaluation Team were able to contact some others who were closely 
involved in the mine action efforts in Eritrea during the period leading-up to the expulsion 
order, or who were active in the Mine Action Support Group (MASG)7 at the time.8 A by-
product of this decision was, of course, further delay in presenting the final report. Events in 
Eritrea have had significant effect on the country’s mine action programme, and this report no 
longer reflects the current status on the ground. Nonetheless, a number of the conclusions and 
recommendations are important in general and, in particular, for mine action operations 
during the course of peacekeeping operations. The subsequent events in no way impinge on 
their validity or relevance of these conclusions and recommendations. 
 
                                            
5 Unfortunately, the officials met in Bratislava had not been directly involved during the period the 
Slovak demining units and equipment were part of UNMEE, and provided only limited information. 
6 The draft report was submitted in early December, and the meeting in New York was 17 January 
2005. HALO Trust’s comments had been delayed in part because their programme manager for 
Eritrea for the relevant period had since moved to another organisation. On his own initiative, this 
individual had, in mid-January, submitted a response to the questionnaire, which his former colleagues 
had forwarded to him – of course, he emphasised that he was responding in his personal capacity and 
his views should not be construed as the official position of HALO Trust. 
7 The MASG comprises (mainly) New York-based representatives of countries which actively support 
mine action. Initially quite informal, it has enlarged its role gradually over the years, and by 2002 was 
an important forum for information-sharing between UN agencies and donor countries. Unfortunately, 
the regular practice of preparing thorough minutes and distributing these widely appears only to have 
started in November 2002, just after the expulsion order (a MASG meeting had occurred on 5 
September 2002, and a number of presentations were made concerning the Eritrean expulsion order.  
We have obtained at least some of these statements, but were unable to obtain the minutes 
themselves. 
8 As many of the points at issue were left unresolved in the immediate aftermath of the expulsion and, 
indeed, remain so today, these individuals contributed in a personal capacity on the assurance of 
confidentiality, and the additional information provided is speculative to some degree. Their names are 
not listed in Annex 4. 
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All four members of the evaluation team contributed to the drafting of the final report; 
conclusions and recommendations resulted from close team interaction. The report is an 
attempt to trace the development of the overall demining effort in the Temporary Security 
Zone, learn from the findings and define recommendations for the future. Chapter 2 provides 
an historical and political perspective placing mine action in the TSZ into context. The next 
chapter deals with the question of mandate, the relative vagueness of which has given rise to 
various interpretations of responsibilities. This chapter also deals briefly with the innovative 
model of integrated management that has earned the MACC a UN 21 award for excellence. 
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 deal with aspects of operations of the MACC, the changing nature and the 
challenges of its work, its relation to national authorities and other mine action actors, its 
financing, and its staffing. Chapter 7 provides a commentary on information technology and 
the excellent work the MACC has done in this area in spite of tools that are still undergoing 
growing pains. Chapters 8 and 9 deal with the technical aspects of demining assets deployed, 
the problems encountered, and the cost-effectiveness of using commercial as opposed to 
military assets, as well as some observations on the performance of UNOPS. The last chapter 
provides conclusions, defines the lessons learned, and lists all recommendations made in the 
report. 
 
One last point requires mention. GICHD is responsible for supporting and further 
development of the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA). The Terms 
of Reference included the requirement to “Evaluate the effectiveness of the IMSMA system 
and determine how it has contributed to the overall management of the mine action 
programme in Eritrea.” Clearly there is a potential conflict of interest, which GICHD 
managed in the following fashion: 
 
• It clearly declared the potential conflict of interest in its proposal, together with the 
steps it would take to mitigate this, (as below): 
• It engaged an independent consultant of established repute from outside the Mine 
Action field to serve as Team Leader for the Evaluation; 
• It specifically tasked the independent consultant/team leader with the responsibility for 
the assessment of the information management function of UNMEE MACC, including 
the IMSMA; 
• No members of the evaluation team discussed the IMSMA in Eritrea with the IMSMA 
unit in GICHD until the draft report was completed, at which point a copy of the draft 
report was distributed to the IMSMA unit at GICHD for comment along with other 
stakeholders. 
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Chapter 2 – Historical and Political Context 
 
2.1 Eritrea’s Struggle for Independence 
 
An understanding of the challenges that UNMEE MACC has had to face in the past, and is 
still facing today, requires a brief exposé of the country's recent history. 
 
Eritrea has been under colonial rule for long periods of time. Italian colonization started in 
1881 and lasted for 60 years, until 1941. Establishing an outpost in Assab in 1881, the Italians 
moved northward to Massawa and in 1890 the Italian king proclaimed the colony of Eritrea, 
with the port of Massawa as its capital. The capital was moved to Asmara in the mid 1890's 
and a period of infrastructure development (roads and communications networks) 
commenced. However, strict colour-based restrictions were placed on the local population, 
excluding locals from schools, jobs and social services. 
 
In the face of an assault by British forces in 1941, Italy lost control over Eritrea. The British 
stayed until 1952 and introduced a number of reforms that allowed new forms of organisation, 
including an institutional framework for political action. The disposition of Italy's former 
colonies fell to the newly established United Nations. The latter approved a controversial 
proposal by the United States to establish a federation between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the latter 
being granted the right of self-administration with authority over the police, local taxes and 
other domestic affairs, but with Ethiopia controlling Eritrea's defence, foreign affairs, finance 
and international trade.  
 
Over the next decade Ethiopia was accused of asserting itself on Eritrea's domestic affairs. 
Ethiopia decreed a preventive detention law, arrested newspaper editors, drove prominent 
nationalists into exile, and banned trade unions and political parties. On November 14, 1962, 
the Eritrean Parliament was dissolved and Eritrea was annexed as Ethiopia's fourteenth 
province.  
 
On July 1960 the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) was established by exiled Eritreans in Cairo 
and a little more than a year later a small band of ELF guerrillas, armed with antiquated 
Italian rifles, fired the first shots on police in western Eritrea. The country's 30-year liberation 
struggle had started. Internal rivalries weakened the ELF but near the end of the decade the 
struggle was resumed with renewed vigour under a re-organised command and a new name: 
the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF). The struggle was hard on the whole population 
and in the mid-1980s war and famine combined to create a human crisis of horrific 
proportions. By 1985, some 360,000 Eritrean refugees had fled to Sudan. Several hundred 
thousand more were internally displaced.  
 
Eventually Eritrea gained its independence in 1991, and a period of reconstruction started. 
Rumblings of war started anew, however. Throughout 1996 and 1997, tensions arose between 
Eritrea and Ethiopia over economic and political issues. There followed a series of armed 
incidents causing the death of several officials near Badme, a small, dry and dusty village in 
the western region of Eritrea. Three rounds of combat in 1998-2000 produced hundreds of 
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thousands of casualties and resulted in countless Internally Displaced People (IDPs).9 
Eventually Ethiopia and Eritrea agreed to a cease-fire, and on December 12, 2000, the two 
countries signed a Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Algiers. Under its terms, a 25 km 
wide Temporary Security Zone was established, largely within Eritrea, to be patrolled by UN 
peacekeeping forces. 
 
The forces were mandated to operate in the TSZ  and “adjacent areas”, a term roughly defined 
by the UN as 15 km either side of the TSZ boundary and inserted into the mandate to allow 
for some flexibility in the interpretation and, especially, the execution of tasks. The TSZ is 
primarily located on Eritrean soil which tends to influence the relationship between the 
Eritrean Government and the PKF. This sensitive fact may have contributed to the attitude 
displayed by the Government in drastically revising mine action authority in the zone (see 
below). 
 
Landmine and UXO contamination is spread throughout Eritrea, and it is serious. After the 
Landmine Impact Study (LIS), some 310 sq. km. were suspected of being contaminated 
(IMSMA data). 
 
Decisions and attitudes of the current Eritrean Government should be seen in the light of this 
historical background and the seriousness of the contamination. The Eritreans are a proud and 
independent people who, indeed, fought and sacrificed for a very long period of time to gain 
their freedom. They gained it with little outside help, and they are not prepared now to 
welcome such help in an uncritical way, having been disappointed in the past. This spirit of 
independence also tends to explain the drastic decision in mid 2002 to expel foreign demining 
NGOs, thus bringing a virtual halt to all national and NGO demining activities in the country. 
 
2.2 Proclamation 123 (2002) 
 
In mid 2002, the President of Eritrea, H.E Isayas Afworki, surprised the donor community by 
announcing the establishment of a new demining agency (the Eritrean Demining Authority or 
EDA), and disbanding the existing one (the Eritrean Mine Action Programme or EMAP). 
Shortly thereafter he ordered all demining NGOs to leave the country. Three NGOs left 
promptly - Danish Church Aid (DCA), Danish Demining Group (DDG), and Mine Awareness 
Trust (MAT). A fourth NGO (HALO Trust) managed to stay on for roughly another year – 
and even planned an expansion of its project – but then also departed.10 What motivated the 
President to take such a drastic step? 
 
During a meeting with UN representatives on August 23, 2002, the President made the 
following essential comments. His main concern is the return of IDPs. To this end he wants to 
expedite landmine clearance. There have been undue delays in clearance. The effectiveness of 
                                            
9 Accurate statistics on IDPs and Refugees are hard to come by. UNHCR estimates that, since the 
beginning of their work in Eritrea in 2000, some 200,000 refugees have returned home (Eritrea at 
large, few to the TSZ), mostly from Sudan. Of these, some 80,000 returned spontaneously, and 
120,000 returned with the assistance of UNHCR.  The latter estimates that some 50-60,000 refugees 
still reside in Sudan as registered refugees, and double this figure as non-registered refugees. 
UNHCR notices a current outflow of Eritreans to Sudan and Ethiopia. UNHCR is not dealing with IDPs, 
and statistics on them are not available (UNMEE MACC has tried for years to obtain an accurate 
picture of IDPs in the TSZ, thus far to no avail).   
10 The commercial demining company Ronco, funded by the US State Department, managed to 
continue operations after intervention by the US.  
Final, August 2005 
 7 
NGOs is questionable: they seem to be “all over the place”. Even worse, UNMEE's demining 
work is slow, very expensive,11 and very ineffective.12 It cannot deliver, and should not 
become involved in demining for demarcation, which should be left to a professional 
demining company. Eritrea will establish its own demining authority. We will do it on our 
own. We want to start with a clean slate. But, even though UNMEE is “a new kind of 
monster”, other UN agencies could play a useful role in the country (e.g. health and 
education).  We will plan and design our own mine action structure, and submit it to the 
relevant UN specialised agencies to decide if they want to participate. 
 
His comments contained a strong flavour of wanting to go it alone, no matter what the costs. 
His words showed a profound distrust of UNMEE mine action capabilities. He appeared to 
have a genuine concern for IDPs. He also expressed great scepticism with respect to the 
coordination of NGO activities, and of their ultimate usefulness. Indeed, this scepticism 
apparently had been growing for some time, and various NGO informants mentioned that they 
had been very concerned about it during the days leading up to the proclamation.13 There was 
no indication that UNMAS was either aware of the developing situation, or took 
precautionary steps to avoid an outburst. 
 
The decision to start with a clean slate angered many in the UN and NGO community. Indeed, 
it would have been much preferable to attain local mine action self-sufficiency by phasing out 
NGOs over time and incorporating their competence into local institutional arrangements.  
Instead, the embryonic Eritrean Mine Action Programme, whose offices were located on the 
premises of the MACC, was disbanded and a new organisation was created, at least in name – 
the Eritrean Demining Authority (EDA). Mine action had come to a virtual halt and would not 
come back to life until at least a year later through some sporadic core staff appointments and 
UNDP assistance. The wish to do it on their own is very laudable, but it requires a readiness 
to allocate sufficient resources, and a willingness to accept technical advice until self-
sufficiency is reached. The reality is that it took considerable time for EDA to work on its 
own and it still depends heavily on UNDP assistance in capacity building. The appointment of 
the General Manager took time; the work of the UNDP capacity support team has been 
hampered by a lack of sufficient counterparts, EDA's operating arm (Eritrean Demining 
Operation - EDO) lacks support in terms of logistics, equipment, and supplies. 
 
On the more positive side, however, EDO now has a number of demining teams at work 
(manual cum mine detection dogs), and has plans to expand in the near future. These teams 
are doing work in accordance with IMAS, in very difficult terrain. The draconian decision to 
expel NGOs in order to force mine action self-sufficiency seemed ill advised but, given time 
and UNDP's continued support, EDA capacity may slowly develop further. This is especially 
so since there are signs of a re-awakened donor interest with, for example, substantial 
contributions by Norway to UNDP's capacity building project.  
                                            
11 In addition to the high costs of the many expatriates in the MACC and various Mine Action 
organisations, a specific concern of the powerful Ministry of Defence was the comparatively high 
salaries paid to deminers by the international demining organisations, which led to dissatisfaction 
within their own engineering units. 
12 Of course the President has a military background. HALO Trust’s reply to our questionnaire and 
their earlier correspondence with members of the Mine Action Support Group (MASG) make particular 
reference to clearance operations at Shilalo (conducted by UNMACC and Minetech), and said the 
President was aware of, and extremely dissatisfied with, the details of that task, in which two EDA-a 
deminers died. 
13 See, for example, the presentations submitted or made to the MASG in August-September 2002. 
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Of great benefit, in the interim, has been the work of Ronco, a US-based demining firm 
(working on behalf of the US State Department), which reports to EDA. The company is 
engaged in land clearance using two teams of 60 individuals per team, divided into four units 
each, with manual detectors and a total of 15 dogs. It manages to clear, to the highest 
standards, some 200,000 square meters a month; substantially more than any other area 
clearance operation in the country (see discussion on cost effectiveness in chapter 9).14   
     
2.3 The Current Stalemate 
 
One would hope the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities signed in Algiers on December 
12, 2000, would have been the end of the trials and tribulations of the two nations. But it may 
not be so. The Ethiopian-Eritrean Boundary Commission (EEBC), an independent body of 
international experts, who were approved in advance by both parties, was established to 
examine and recommend the precise boundary between the two countries. The deliberations 
of this Commission were based on, among many other things, a close examination of old 
Italian maps. The Commission concluded its deliberations in 2003, recommending in detail 
the location of the boundary. Its recommendations were fully accepted by both parties. Not 
long afterwards, however, Ethiopia had a change of mind and announced that it could not 
accept the inclusion of Badme, the dusty hamlet, into Eritrean territory. Since then there has 
been a stalemate, with tensions rising. In his progress report on Ethiopia and Eritrea dated 
July 2004, the Secretary General mentions a deterioration in the relations between UNMEE 
and the Eritrean Government. The deterioration manifested itself in a number of areas, 
including restrictions on the Mission's freedom of movement, closure of an important supply 
route to UNMEE traffic, continuing detentions by the authorities of locally recruited UN staff, 
and a recent spate of public statements by some Eritrean officials attacking the peacekeeping 
operation and its staff.15 Although the Secretary General reported slight improvements in his 
next progress report of September 2, 2004,16 the relationship remains tense. 
 
The UN envoy, Dr. Lloyd Axworthy of Canada, appointed to try to mediate between the two 
countries, has thus far failed to gain access to Eritrea's President who maintains that there is 
nothing to discuss since both parties already have agreed.   
 
Also important are indications of strong top-down management of the country. Recently all 
internet cafés in Asmara were closed. Young men were picked from the streets of Asmara to 
do their military service (a practice that is not new to the country). Insiders fear that the 
possibility of armed conflict cannot be excluded in the future, even the near future. The 
Boundary Commission remains unable to proceed with the demarcation of the border. Its (by 
now very limited) presence in the area may have to be terminated by the end of 2004 in order 
to preserve remaining funds earmarked for demarcation activities. 
 
Given this historical background, the current political climate and the stalemate with respect 
to demarcation, how relevant is the current mandate of UNMEE MACC? In the next chapter 
                                            
14 Mechem, another highly effective demining firm working for UNMEE MACC is currently engaged for 
road clearance, and no valid comparison with Ronco’s area clearance can be made. 
15 Security Council, Progress report of the Secretary-General on Ethiopia and Eritrea, July 7, 2004, 
S/2004/543. 
16 Security Council, Progress report of the Secretary-General on Ethiopia and Eritrea, September 2, 
2004, S/2004/708. 
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we will examine this question in some detail, starting with a review of the Security Council 
Resolutions that have thus far defined the framework of the MACC's activities. 
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Chapter 3 – The Mandate of UNMEE MAC 
 
3.1 Security Council Resolutions 
 
The UNMEE MACC received its mandate from two Security Council resolutions: 
 
Security Council Resolution 1320 (2000): 
 
Coordinate and provide technical assistance for humanitarian mine action activities in the 
TSZ and area adjacent to it. 
  
Security Council Resolution 1430 (2002) 
 
Demining in key areas to support demarcation. 
 
There are other security council references to mine action relating to UNMEE:  
 
• Security Council Resolution 1344 (2001) incorporated the following statement: 
“Facilitate mine action in coordination with the United Nations Mine Action Service, in 
particular through exchanging and providing existing maps and any other relevant 
information to the United Nations.” This was intended as an instruction to the 
governments of Ethiopia and Eritrea to provide minefield maps, and did not impact the 
MACC mandate 
 
• Resolution 1466 (2003), in which the Security Council “notes the work done by the 
UNMEE Mine Action Coordination Centre in demining and education on risk related to 
mines, and urges the parties to pursue efforts on mine clearance.” Again, this did not 
affect the MACC mandate. 
 
• In more general terms, the President of the Security Council, in a statement dated 
November 19, 2003, strongly supported mine action as an activity that "can play an 
important role in peace-building and confidence-building in post-conflict situations."17 
There seems, therefore, sufficient recognition in the Security Council of the importance of 
mine action in relation to PKM activities.  
 
3.1.1 Resolution 1320 
 
Resolution 1320 seems, at first sight, relevant to the circumstances prevailing at the time. It 
opened the door for the MACC to humanitarian mine action, particularly in terms of 
coordination and provision of technical assistance. Aside from numerous casualties, the 1998-
2000 border conflict resulted in countless displaced Eritreans, many from the TSZ. There was 
a humanitarian disaster, calling for a humanitarian response.  
 
                                            
17 Security Council, Statement by the President of the Security Council, November 19, 2003, 
S/prst/2003.22 
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International humanitarian mine action NGOs18 had started operations at about the same time 
as the arrival of the Peacekeeping Force, but there was a lack of oversight and a virtual 
absence of national strategic mine action planning. The situation was complex, and 
coordination of NGO activities proved problematic, partly because some NGOs may not have 
been easily controllable, partly because there was no strong national mine action agency 
capable of such coordination, and partly because the complexity of coordination was under-
estimated and the task was, in the view of various informants, simply not properly carried 
out.19 
 
In order to try to build a bridge to the Government, staff of the Eritrean Mine Action 
Programme (EMAP); a fledgling government agency; were given accommodation on the 
premises of the MACC. This appears to have underscored the need for a clear separation 
between the UNMEE MACC and an independent national mine action entity. The token 
presence of EMAP mine action staff on MACC premises was symptomatic of a lack of clear 
vision and commitment, on the part of the Government, with respect to the establishment of a 
strong and independent mine action agency fully representing Eritrean interests. 
 
The location of EMAP on the premises of UNMEE MACC was a poor substitute for the need 
to create local mine action capacity on its own. It is true that EMAP and UNOPS had signed a 
formal MOU for capacity development including rental of the facility. It is also true that 
UNDP was similarly housed in the compound. Yet, in hindsight, an over-arching agreement 
with the Government specifying in detail the tasks of the MACC in terms of local mine action 
capacity building, may have prevented subsequent problems and Government animosity. It 
has turned out to be critical that a mine action centre under the mandate of a UN 
Peacekeeping mission be guided by such a formal agreement. In a MACC paper dated 
September 2003 it is stated: 
 
“By stepping outside its mandate, without an official agreement between the Government and 
UNMEE, the MACC increasingly lost focus of its originally mandated responsibilities…An 
official agreement is crucial to avoid confusion…”20 
 
The attempt to support the establishment of indigenous capacity is one of the most important 
steps to be taken at the beginning of a Peacekeeping mission. The findings of the Study 
Report of the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs are relevant where it says 
 
"…the UN focal point must take quick and early action to help national and local authorities 
address the humanitarian implications of landmines. The realization of this objective cannot 
be considered of lesser value than the organization of mine action activities focused on 
addressing Peacekeeping operational needs. It is equally important that any activity or 
                                            
18 HALO Trust, Danish Demining Group, Danish Church Aid, and Mine Awareness Trust. 
19 See also, for example, comments by HALO Trust in this respect, later in this report. As well, the 
report on findings submitted by members of the MASG following their fieldtrip to Eritrea in May 2002 
highlighted “The vital importance of transparent and constructive cooperation with all the mine action 
partners, including NGO’s, has been stressed…” The concern seems to relate specifically to 
coordination between the MACC and NGOs, as the next line stated that “cooperation and coordination 
between the MACC and NGO’s is improving…” 
20 Lessons Learned since 2000, September 2003, UNMEE MACC. 
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capacity which is generated under the auspices of a UN mission form part of a coherent plan 
focused on enabling national authorities meet long-term responsibilities."21 
 
There is also the more fundamental question whether an entity such as the MACC, with 
responsibilities to discharge directly, is a suitable vehicle for driving a capacity-building 
effort. Abundant evidence exists from the field of international development that the 
achievements of technical advisors often are disappointing and, in particular, often fail to 
achieve much progress in developing the ‘high-level’ capacities required for managerial and 
organisational performance. A contributing factor in many cases is the fact that, in spite of 
their titles, advisors are often judged by whether the local organisation achieves observable 
performance improvements. Often it is easier to improve organisational performance by doing 
the job oneself rather than training others and hoping for the best, and many advisors fall into 
the trap of ‘doing’ rather than ‘advising’, which then inhibits the capacities of local managers 
by denying them the opportunity to do their own analysis, take decisions, and – a necessary 
part of learning – make mistakes. Personnel in a MACC, having their own responsibilities for 
tasking, QA, information management, and so on would be under even more pressure to do 
jobs by themselves which, for the sake of capacity development, should be left to local 
officials. 
 
For this reason, it would be preferable if UNDP’s mandate for capacity development was 
given greater emphasis from the start, rather than having its programme being subsumed, in 
appearance at least, within the MACC. As subsequent events have shown, capacity building22 
by the UNDP (an entity without links to the Peacekeeping Force) was much more acceptable 
to the Government. We can extract a recommendation: 
 
Any involvement of a peacekeeping mission, or an entity closely associated with a 
peacekeeping mission, to support building of indigenous mine action capacity, should 
generally be contemplated only with a full understanding and consideration of the 
consequences. Such involvement should be subject to a clear and unambiguous 
agreement between the UN and the Government at the highest level identifying mutual 
commitments and responsibilities.  
 
One can make another important, closely related, observation here, already alluded to earlier. 
A mine action centre with close ties to the Peacekeeping Force was given a coordinating role 
for humanitarian mine action that normally would be the responsibility of a national body. It 
is clear from the experience in Eritrea that involvement of peacekeepers, or those closely 
associated with the Peacekeeping Force, to achieve such an objective is not necessarily, nor 
automatically, a good idea. Nor does it appear to have been warmly received by the Eritrean 
Government authorities (as comments made earlier have intimated). While there are no 
absolutes in this matter, and other Governments might have welcomed a coordinating role by 
an entity with ties to a Peacekeeping Force, one should not assume that this is true for all 
                                            
21 Study Report, The development of indigenous mine action capacities, UN Department of 
Humanitarian Affairs, New York, 1997. p.27 
22 As defined by the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD, capacity building (or capacity 
development) is “…the process by which individuals, groups, organisations, institutions, and societies 
increase their abilities to: (1) perform core functions, solve problems, define and achieve objectives; 
and (2) understand and deal with their development needs in a broad context and in a sustainable 
manner….”. Enhancing operational and technical capacities, while often necessary, clearly is 
insufficient for the challenge of capacity development of organisations and (even more ambitious) 
networks of organisations such as a national mine action programme.  
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circumstances. We, therefore, have to conclude again that an official agreement with the 
Government at the highest level might have prevented subsequent problems that ultimately 
resulted in the expulsion of mine action NGOs.23 
  
In this context it may be useful to refer to the conclusions of a study conducted by the OECD 
in 1998.24 It notes that the civilian sector, by virtue of its extensive experience, has a 
comparative advantage in most aspects of the provision of humanitarian assistance. The study 
mentions: 
 
"The political realities that surround the involvement of the military make it an unpredictable 
asset for humanitarian assistance operations in several ways. First, political constraints often 
mean that military assets cannot be deployed until after the peak of a crisis has been reached. 
Second, recent experience indicates that when militaries are deployed for humanitarian 
purposes their involvement in security matters will be restricted. Finally, the use of the 
military can at times politicise the delivery of humanitarian aid and threaten the neutrality, 
impartiality and independence of that aid".25    
 
By assigning the MACC coordinating responsibilities for humanitarian mine action, the 
question as to which activities should be coordinated, and carried out by whom, were left 
unanswered. Also unanswered was the question as to how this mandate would support Force 
requirements. By defining the role of a civilian-run mine action centre associated with a 
peacekeeping force, it would seem important to reflect on the comparative advantage such a 
centre would have. As subsequent discussion in this report will elaborate, a civilian MACC is 
fully familiar with IMAS, can ensure that demining operations are IMAS compatible, and can 
train demining contingents in the application of IMAS. In addition, a civilian-run mine action 
centre is not subject to short-term rotation, and has flexibility in subcontracting non-military 
demining assets (NGOs, commercial firms) in order to establish the right “mix” of assets. At 
the same time, lines of command are clear, and confusion with dual loyalty exhibited by 
contingent deminers (loyalty to home country and loyalty to the Force Commander) are 
avoided. Most importantly, a civilian-run mine action centre can propose mine action that 
could address both Force requirements as well as community aspirations (see also discussion 
below). 
 
Resolution 1320 provided a perhaps tantalizing, but very incomplete, glimpse of the thinking 
that went on during the Joint Assessment Mission (JAM). While we may look into the 
deliberations of this mission for guidance, clearly defined terms of reference for the MACC, 
especially with respect to coordination and capacity development, should have been prepared 
for discussion with the Government, leading to a comprehensive agreement.  We may 
formulate another recommendation: 
 
Activities of a Mine Action Centre resulting from a Security Council Resolution should 
be defined in clear terms of reference, that can than be made the subject of an 
overarching agreement with the Government concerned. 
                                            
23 The Sri Lankan Government similarly objected to a role for the relevant mine action centre that 
would encroach on non-military areas of responsibilities, whereas other governments have welcomed 
such roles. 
24 Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation, Report No.1, Civilian and military means of 
providing and supporting humanitarian assistance during conflict - Comparative Advantages and 
Costs, OECD, Paris, 1998. 
25 Ibid, page 32. 
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With the developments of mid-2002, and the subsequent establishment of the Eritrean 
Demining Authority which now decides demining priorities, the MACC's mandate resulting 
from Resolution 1320 is no longer of much relevance. In fact, the MACC currently consults 
very closely with EDA before embarking on demining tasks. It now only coordinates those 
demining assets which fall under its own direct authority. 
 
3.1.2  Resolution 1430 
 
The second resolution deals only with support to demarcation, leaving many other mine 
action responsibilities in a virtual grey zone. It takes a creative mind to carve out a meaningful 
mandate when the resolution confines the MACC to clearing small staging areas and access 
routes for the placement of demarcation pillars. The problem is further confounded by the 
current demarcation stalemate. Strictly going by a literal interpretation of the official mandate, 
then, the scope of work of the MACC is, at the moment, limited indeed. 
 
The events of mid-2002 where the Eritrean authorities forcefully asserted themselves on the 
local demining scene resulted in a re-evaluation of the MACC's role (see Chapter 4 for 
details). The question arises whether, given the profoundly different circumstances prevailing 
after Proclamation 123, the dimensions of the MACC’s responsibilities should have been 
revisited by the Security Council; especially since the MACC’s original coordinating mandate 
had become largely irrelevant. There is no indication that this was done. The current boundary 
stalemate does not help things. 
 
It is recommended that, in defining the mandate of a civilian mine action coordination 
centre attached to a peacekeeping mission, considerable effort be made to outline, for 
Security Council deliberations, the general scope of the MACC’s responsibilities within 
the evolving context of political, humanitarian and peacekeeping realities, and in line 
with the MACC’s comparative advantage. 
 
3.2 Peacekeeping Objectives 
 
Realizing that the Security Council Resolutions only partially indicate UNMEE MACC 
responsibilities, we are left with the task of finding out more about what these responsibilities 
entail. In doing so, our starting point will have to be the fact that the MACC's essential task is, 
first and foremost, to support the force component of the Peacekeeping Mission (see textbox 
on Mission versus Force objectives). If we can identify the objectives of the Peacekeeping 
Forces, we can then deduce the scope of work relevant to the MACC.  
 
Textbox 1 – Mission versus Force Objectives 
The presence of international military forces with a peacekeeping mandate is the defining feature of a 
peacekeeping mission, but there are other components to such missions such as political, public 
relations, and administrative. Normally, the peacekeeping mission will have a broader mandate than 
the peacekeeping forces. 
 
In the Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council (S/2000/785), leading to Security Council’s 
Resolution 1320, the statement is made on page 3 that “the mandate of the expanded United Nations 
Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea would be to:” – it then gives nine points including “(h) Coordinate and 
provide technical assistance for humanitarian mine action activities in the temporary security zone and 
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areas adjacent to it;” Later on the same page it notes…“UNMEE would be composed of political, 
military, public information, mine action and administrative components.” Thus, the Secretary 
General’s report lists nine aspects of the UNMEE (i.e. “mission”) mandate and has mine action as a 
distinct UNMEE component, not subsumed within the military component. Thus, it appears the intent 
was to have an UNMEE ‘Mission MACC’, not an UNMEE ‘Force MACC’. This point was emphasised 
repeatedly by some officers in UNMAS headquarters (although not the personnel based in Eritrea). 
 
However, the Security Council Resolution itself states: 
 
“Authorizes the deployment within UNMEE of up to 4,200 troops, including up to 220 military 
observers, until March 2001, with a mandate to:” […the same 9 points including (h) relating to 
humanitarian mine action.] 
 
In the eyes of the evaluators, the Security Council Resolution established the Peacekeeping Force 
component of UNMEE and places the humanitarian mine action component under that force’s 
mandate, even though this is not fully consistent with the Secretary General’s report. Of course, the 
Force is a component of the mission and, in that sense, a MACC reporting to the Force Commander 
supports the mission’s mandates.* However – and for good reasons – the scope of action of 
international military forces is typically defined in precise terms and (as illustrated most dramatically by 
Bosnia and Rwanda) Force commanders are expected to adhere to these limits even if mayhem is 
unfolding before their eyes.  
 
Regardless of the intent implied in the Secretary General’s Report, given the reporting structures 
actually created by the Security Council Resolution the fundamental question to be asked is “how can 
the MACC best serve Force and Mission objectives?”  
 
Mission objectives include, to: (i) promote the successful conclusion of the peace process (ii) monitor 
the TSZ; (iii) ensure coordination of UN efforts in delivering humanitarian assistance, monitoring 
human rights, promoting mine awareness education and demining activities in the zone; (iv) chair the 
MCC; and (v) provide administrative and logistical support to the EEBC. Force objectives are a sub-set 
of mission objectives. The latter, therefore, include the four goals for this Force as outlined by the 
Force Commander, to: (i) stay informed; (ii) win confidence of the two governments; (iii) ensure 
mobility for the troops; and (iv) win the hearts and minds of the people. In the case of Eritrea at least, 
the Commander’s “hearts and minds” goal appears to be ample room for the MACC to target mine 
action activities to support the Mission objective of coordinating UN efforts in delivering humanitarian 
assistance. 
 
* UNMAS has pointed-out that the MACC Programme Manager reports to the DSRSG on policy matters, and to 
the Force Commander concerning operations. This arrangement is not necessarily inconsistent with the 
Resolution given that some mechanism above the PKF is needed at least to identify requirements for 
“…humanitarian mine action activities in the temporary security zone and areas adjacent to it”  and to discuss how 
to address these requirements. However, the view that the MACC was established as a part of the Mission 
distinct from the Peacekeeping Force component seems inconsistent with the Security Council Resolution. At the 
very least, this contributed to the confusion over the authorised mandate of the MACC.  
 
(Sources: Secretary General’s report to the Security Council (S/2000/785); Security Council Resolution (S/RES/1320 of 2000); Substantive 
guidance to the Mission by the USG in April 2004) 
 
What are the objectives of the Force? In a discussion with the Force Commander, Major 
General Rajender Singh, the Evaluation Team learned that the objectives can be formulated 
briefly as follows: 
 
1) Stay fully informed of all events in the peacekeeping zone, i.e. keep eyes and ears 
open; 
2) Win the confidence of the two governments involved, and be respectful of the cultures 
of the two nations; 
3) Ensure mobility for the troops; and 
4) Win the hearts and minds of the people. 
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The pursuit of objectives 3 and 4 are especially important for the MACC. Road clearance is 
now being provided by a commercial demining company, Mechem, which has a worldwide 
reputation. The services of Mechem now ensure safe troop mobility in a cost-effective 
manner, and directly support objective 3 (see also Chapter 9 in this respect). 
 
It is objective 4 that offers interesting scope for MACC support. In order to try to achieve the 
objective of winning hearts and minds of the local population, the Force is engaged in Quick 
Impact Projects (QIPs) for villagers. Such projects may include the building of small water 
reservoirs, wells, etc. It was outside the Evaluation Team's mandate to examine these small 
projects, and to determine to what extent such projects are integrated into demining activities, 
if at all. The Evaluation Team feels, however, that strategic demining activities on the part of 
the MACC, combined with QIPs, could certainly go a long way in helping the Peacekeeping 
Force to achieve this objective. One could envisage an enhanced scope of activities for 
UNMEE MACC that would include the inclusion of specific and strategic QIPs in a demining 
programme that would not only support the Peacekeeping Forces directly, but also bring 
important secondary benefits to communities.    
 
It is recommended that the mandate of a civilian Mine Action Coordination Centre 
within a peacekeeping mission be enhanced by tying it very closely to the objectives of 
the Peacekeeping Force itself (and perhaps those of the broader mission26), necessitating 
a careful analysis of ways in which the MACC can satisfy basic aspirations of the people 
in the region in line with the Force’s goals. 
 
Of interest in this respect is the fact that this enhanced role for the MACC would not only 
address Force requirements, but also Mission requirements in terms of “ensuring the 
coordination of UN efforts in the delivery of humanitarian assistance”27 
 
3.3  Command and Control Structure 
 
In attempting to define a basic model for a MACC supporting a peacekeeping mission, there 
is not only the question of enhanced mandate as suggested above, but also the issue of 
management. Of particular importance here is the relationship between a civilian-run MACC 
and demining contingents belonging to the Force. 
 
The confusion that may arise from trying to coordinate two parallel demining activities has 
been admirably resolved by integrating the Force Mine Action Centre (FMAC) with the 
UNMEE MACC, without disrupting the authority of the Force Commander. Of importance is 
that the two parties share common premises for ease of communication. FMAC has placed its 
staff under the same roof as UNMEE MACC, sharing office space in the MACC compound. 
The decision-making process is as simple as it is ingenious. The programme manager of 
MACC proposes priorities to the Force commander, who then approves/adjusts the proposal 
                                            
26 It may well be that situating mine action as a distinct component of a peacekeeping mission, rather 
than an element of the peacekeeping force component, would simplify matters. However, it might also 
complicate working relationships to the demining units supplied by TCCs or lead to divisions within the 
mission concerning the relative priorities accorded to demining to support, say, force mobility and 
humanitarian efforts. Regardless, if UNMEE and UNMAS wished Mine Action to be a distinct 
component, they should have had this reflected in subsequent Security Council Resolutions to give 
themselves the clear authority to operate in such a fashion. 
27 Guidance to the Mission by the USG in April 2004 to prepare for the next budget cycle ’05-‘06 
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and directs his troops accordingly. The structure also benefits from the already existing access 
to two sources of funds: the Voluntary Trust Fund of UNMAS and the UNMEE Assessed 
Contribution budget. This double funding access has ensured that the MACC has been, and 
continues to be, adequately resourced. The integration of the two demining capabilities has 
earned the MACC a UN 21 award. 
 
UNMEE MACC is the first MACC to be integrated into a Peacekeeping Mission and could 
serve as a template for future Peacekeeping Missions requiring mine action. The lesson 
learned is that 
 
The integration of civil and military mine action assets under a joint mine action 
structure, fully respecting Force authority, is an efficient and effective way to plan and 
execute a mine action response within a Peacekeeping Mission.   
 
We now have the basic ingredients of a potentially very effective mine action centre attached 
to a Peacekeeping Mission. The model is an integrated one, fully respects the Force 
Commander's authority, and functions strictly in support of the Mission's objectives. In order 
to be effective, it requires a clearly defined mandate that addresses two of the fundamental 
concerns of the Force: mobility and satisfaction of the local population. Winning the hearts 
and minds of the population offers a much wider scope for mine action than currently existing 
Security Council resolutions would tend to indicate.  
 
A complicating factor of an integrated operation is the limited authority the MACC enjoys as 
a coordinating body. The MOUs with individual TCCs do not give the MACC the necessary 
mandate to establish performance requirements, or to require military demining units to 
follow IMAS-compatible technical and safety standards. These MOUs are merely financial 
documents stating that reimbursement will be given for personnel/equipment provided. They 
do not include specifications as how to operate. In the view of the evaluation team, this is a 
serious shortcoming. It means that the MACC, as a coordinating body, cannot guarantee a 
uniform clearance standard in its area of responsibility. Even the Force Commander does not 
have the mandate to force a contingent to apply standards issued by the MACC, and to change 
equipment if it is considered to be inappropriate to achieve required clearance standards.28  
 
The military demining units do not submit IMSMA completion reports to the MACC in which 
the particular senior representative formally declares that the area cleared is free of landmines 
and UXO. Commercial companies such as Ronco and Mechem operating in the same area 
have to report on the standardized IMSMA form and have therefore to take responsibility for 
the results (full clearance of land) of their work.29 
 
Tasking orders selected and agreed upon with the local demining authority (EDA) have to go 
through the military chief of operations down to the respective contingent commander. They 
can reject these tasking orders if they are considered inappropriate or inconsistent with the 
particular national regulations. This makes long-term planning for the MACC difficult. 
 
Integration of management does not necessarily resolve the question as to how tasks can, and 
should, be assigned. A recommendation by the authors of an internal UNMEE audit to include 
                                            
28 LtCol Fernand Dias Martins, e-mail to Johannes Dirscherl dated November 19, 2004 
29 See also Chapter 8.3.2 in this respect. 
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humanitarian demining into MACC's activities was rejected by UNMEE.30  It was felt that 
"demining conducted beyond Force protection and mobility is first and foremost an 
operational exercise that increases TCC demining capacity and the proper integration of 
various UN demining actors and capabilities".31 Of importance here are (i) the comparative 
advantage of a commercial /civilian-run entity in most aspects of the provision of demining 
assistance; and (ii) the inherent lack of capacity of Force demining assets to work efficiently, 
and cost-effectively. To quote again from the earlier mentioned OECD study:32 
 
"Civilian assets are, in general, more cost-effective. Military means, which are designed to be 
fail-safe rather than efficient, will cost more task-by-task than civilian means. Moreover, the 
cost of the military providing security for large humanitarian assistance operations will be 
significantly greater than the cost of providing assistance itself. " 
  
At the same time, commanding officers prefer to have military demining assets available in 
their area of operations, in spite of the fact that they may be grossly under-utilized and 
expensive. An added consideration is that contingent deminers contribute to a sense of 
security for the local population. Their mandate is peace building, their presence generates 
confidence. The very least that should be done, then, is to ensure that contingent deminers 
work towards internationally accepted standards and employ the right mechanical and manual 
equipment. 
 
The recognition of separate comparative advantages of military versus commercial and other 
civil demining assets, managed under a joint structure, would have to acknowledge the 
mutually reinforcing nature of the respective capacities. Thus, road clearance for the 
protection of the Peacekeeping Force and the enhancement of military mobility would also 
result in safety for the civilian population. The mutually reinforcing nature of the partnership 
also extends to the assurance of quality and the preservation of the right operating standards. 
Without a clear mandate for the MACC, the introduction and maintenance of International 
Mine Action Standards for TCC demining contingents present a formidable challenge, an area 
requiring special attention. In this respect it is important to recall a statement by the President 
of the Security Council:33 
 
“The Security Council recognizes the contribution that peacekeeping personnel can make in 
the areas of mine risk education and demining and calls upon troop-contributing countries, 
where appropriate, to train selected personnel to demine in accordance with the International 
Mine Action Standards.” 
 
The following recommendations are offered: 
 
UNMAS should be actively involved in the planning for peacekeeping missions, 
including the definition of mission requirements, and work with the Force-generating 
unit in areas of equipment planning and establishment of standards. 
 
                                            
30 OIOS Audit No. AP2004/624/03: Demining Operations in UNMEE,  UN Office of Internal Oversight 
Services Internal Audit Division, September 29, 2004 
31 Ibid. page 5. 
32 Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation, Report No.1, Civilian and Military Means of 
Providing and Supporting Humanitarian Assistance During Conflict, OECD, Paris, 1998, page 32.  
33 Security Council, Statement by the President of the Security Council, November 19, 2003, 
S/prst/2003.22 
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Mission requirements should be reviewed on an agreed basis and schedule to assess 
whether comparative advantages of military versus commercial and other civilian mine 
action entities have shifted. 
 
A MOU with a TCC covering the operation of a demining contingent should include 
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Chapter 4 – Mine Action Programme Development 
 
Mine action activities in Eritrea may be roughly divided into two separate components: the 
programme elements managed by the UNMEE MACC focusing on the TSZ and adjacent 
areas, and the programme elements under the authority of the national EDA. The latter’s 
mandate is nation-wide but its five EDO teams as well as the commercial deminer Ronco 
which reports to EDA similarly operate primarily in the TSZ. EDA is strongly supported by 
the UNDP through its Mine Action Capacity Building Programme (MACBP), and works 
closely with UNICEF in Mine Risk Education. A brief summary of both programmes is 
provided below.34 
 
4.1  Summary of the UNMEE MACC Programme 
 
The MACC was established in August 2000 by UNMAS, utilizing UNOPS as the executing 
agency and with funds from the UNMAS Voluntary Trust Fund.  Consistent with a liberal 
interpretation of its original mandate from the Security Council, the UNMEE MACC 
programme addressed the emergency landmine problem in the TSZ, attempted to coordinate 
the various humanitarian mine action players active in the country at that time, and supported 
the Eritrean Government in establishing and strengthening an indigenous mine action 
capability (EMAP).  
 
 A “Strategy for UN Assistance in Mine Action in Eritrea” was approved in November 2001 
outlining a number of broad goals including: 
 
o strengthening of indigenous mine action capacity,  
o establishment of a comprehensive information base for mine action upon 
which to base a sound national strategy, 
o establishment of national standards and a quality assurance capacity, 
o reduction of the impact of the landmine/UXO threat on the population, and  
o mobilisation of adequate resources for mine action. 
 
This was an ambitious agenda requiring a great deal of energy and commitment, both of 
which are much in evidence as the output seems to indicate.  
 
4.1.1 The period before mid-2002 
 
Progress reports indicate that much was achieved during the first two years. By June 30, 2002, 
the UNMEE MACC was fully staffed with eleven international positions filled. All positions 
were financed under the UNMEE Assessed Budget for July 1, 2001 through June 30, 2002 
under the MOA concluded between the UN and UNOPS. Any periods of service prior to July 
1, 2001 were funded from other sources of income.  By the middle of 2002, the program also 
employed 22 national staff working in different sections of the UNMEE MACC financed by 
the Voluntary Trust Fund.  
                                            
34 The TORs of the Evaluation Team did not call for an evaluation of UNDP’s Mine Action Capacity 
Building Programme, but given the Team had to “analyze the relationship” between the MACC and 
this programme, the subject is treated here to provide a more inclusive picture of mine action in 
Eritrea, and to illustrate the shift in responsibilities that occurred in mid-2002.  
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The focus of mine action during the first year of operation (2001) was on mine risk education 
(MRE) and mine clearance in the TSZ, thus supporting the return of refugees and IDPs, as 
well as supporting UN peacekeeping activities. During 2001, the UNMEE MACC established 
the in-country Technical Safety Standards (TSS) for Eritrea, and worked with EMAP to 
establish accreditation and licensing procedures for all operators working in mine action. 
IMSMA was installed, an important achievement in spite of subsequent growing pains. The 
database was able to produce landmine/UXO area maps which were provided to all 
organisations and agencies working in the TSZ. Formally authorized in writing by EMAP, 
UNMEE MACC implemented a quality control and quality assurance system that allowed 
monitoring the work of clearance operations in the TSZ. Other achievements included 
substantial work on Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs), establishment of two sector 
offices, production of various documents proposing UNMEE MACC support for the 
Boundary Commission, and more.  
 
Much effort was devoted in trying to build EMAP into a national mine action organization. 
For this purpose, UNOPS concluded a MOA with EMAP from January through August 2002 
to provide continued support for staffing, rent, operations, equipment and logistics. Training 
was provided to EMAP with respect to accreditation, quality assurance, standard operating 
procedures, technical safety standards based on IMAS, etc.  
 
In addition UNOPS extended an existing contract with the former Eritrean Demining Agency 
(EDA-1) for three manual clearance teams (consisting of 60 deminers per team) to work in the 
TSZ. MACC and Danish Church Aid (DCA) provided assistance to EDA-1 for both 
headquarters and field team activities and international supervisors were appointed to monitor 
and oversee the work of the three teams.35 During the first half of 2002, the three EDA-1 
teams cleared close to 700,000 square meters of contaminated land, destroyed 186 mines and 
1,430 UXO.  
 
Much effort was spent renovating and upgrading the National Training Centre (NTC), with a 
US$250,000 contribution by GTZ. UNOPS assisted the MACC in conducting a tender and 
issuing a contract for this purpose, and the works were completed under budget. The MACC 
provided instructor support to the NTC, including the training and professional development 
of thirteen national instructors. The MACC also conducted numerous mine action related 
courses at the NTC for representatives of all mine action agencies in Eritrea, but primarily for 
EDA-1 staff. 
 
On April 29, 2002, UNOPS awarded a contract to UXB Africa (Pty) for route clearance, 
(using Assessed Budget funds) for an initial period of six months. This contract was extended 
by another six months. The quality Assurance section fully deployed to the field during the 
first half of 2002; the development of technical safety standards and SOPs for quality 
assurance was completed; mechanical and mine detection dogs test areas were established at 
the NTC and used for accreditation of clearance operators’ assets. The Information Section 
continued the development and maintenance of IMSMA in support of data requirements of 
different parties.  
 
                                            
35 UNMAS, through the MACC, provided substantial funding support to DCA to commence their 
operations in Eritrea due to funding problems DCA experienced during their deployment phase. 
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MRE activities were flourishing. A UNICEF MRE trainer completed the training of teachers 
and community facilitators in MRE and the preparation of in-country MRE training manuals. 
Landmine posters, handouts, educational children games, and other educational materials 
were distributed. MRE was introduced to schools through the Ministry of Education, and 
some 268 teachers were trained by MRE instructors from the NTC. In collaboration with 
UNICEF and the Department of Radio and the Ministry of Information, a national MRE radio 
program was launched. A number of international NGOs and commercial companies were 
participating in the implementation of MRE programs, in addition to the implementation of 
their respective mine clearance operations.36 UNICEF had seconded an MRE officer to the 
MACC since the early stages of the programme who worked with EMAP and other ministries 
on MRE capacity building. 
 
In other words, there was a flurry of intense and important activity on the part of the MACC, 
in collaboration with other parties, before the events of mid-2002 put an abrupt end to it. It is 
most likely that the uncoordinated demining efforts of the various players at that time, alluded 
to in the previous chapter, contributed to the President’s decision to start with a clean slate.  
 
HALO Trust was particularly scathing of the MACC’s performance in terms of coordination, 
but criticism was voiced by others as well. For example, in discussions between a member of 
the evaluation team and Dutch Government officials in The Hague, considerable dismay was 
expressed by the officials concerning the failure of the MACC to convene regular 
coordinating meeting among the various players.37  The members of the MASG fieldtrip to 
Eritrea in May 2002 felt the need to emphasise “The vital importance of transparent and 
constructive cooperation with all the mine action partners, including NGOs.” During a MASG 
meeting on 5 September 2002 in New York, the representative of DCA noted that “In Eritrea, 
coordination between UN, NGO’s and the donors has been missing”.38 Similarly, DCA noted 
that “The UN MACC in Eritrea has failed in planning, tasking and coordination”39 The 
HALO Trust Programme Manager during that time stated: “I really doubt if a claim can be 
made that the UNMEE MACC really coordinated mine action in the TSZ in anything other 
than a basic sense”.40 
 
In defence of MACC’s Programme Manager,41 however, it must be said that UNMAS was 
remiss by not: (i) concluding a relevant overarching agreement with the Government giving 
clear legitimacy and limits to the coordinating role; (ii) providing a clear overall strategy for 
                                            
36 They included HALO Trust, Danish Church Aid (DCA), Danish Demining Group (DDG), Mine 
Awareness Trust (MAT), Landmine Survivors Network (LSN), Ronco and Minetech. 
37 The Dutch Government was a major contributor to HALO in Eritrea. 
38 Notes to the members of Mine Action Support Group (MASG). Presented to the reinforced MASG 
meeting on 5 September 2002 in New York. Page 1. 
39 IBID. Page 3. 
40 Comment on questionnaire asking “In your view, was mine action performed by the respective 
NGOs well coordinated?” 
41 It is not the role of an evaluation team to assess individual performance (“Evaluators are not 
expected to evaluate individuals, and must balance an evaluation of management functions with this 
general principle.” Norms for Evaluation in the UN System, Para. 11.5; Standards for Evaluation in the 
UN System, para. 20, both issued by the UN Evaluation Group, April 2005). However, some highly 
charged and personalised statements were made in writing, both at the time of the expulsion notice 
and in response to our questionnaire, and we feel it necessary to point out the simple fact that 
individual employees function as part of larger organisations and it is important – indeed essential in 
such a politicised environment as Eritrea – that the various levels of that organisation discharge their 
respective responsibilities. 
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the MACC to exercise its mandate; and (iii) defining precise terms of reference for the MACC 
to substantiate a coordinating role. Instead, as was intimated in the previous chapter, the 
MACC was left to manage much on its own, and to define its own role, apparently with scant 
guidance from headquarters. Of relevance is the comment by a DCA representative in this 
respect: “UN MACC in Eritrea has been searching high and low the last year for a 
mandate”.42  In the view of the evaluation team, the ultimate cause of the MACC’s relative 
failure in coordination can be found in the absence of a clearly defined mandate, the 
preparation of which would certainly be the responsibility of UNMAS in New York.   
 
Most serious of all was the failure to identify the mounting irritation of the President that 
resulted in Proclamation 123; a gathering storm that some of the NGOs claim they saw 
coming.43 The evaluation team did not find any evidence that UNMAS anticipated the 
Proclamation, nor that it took appropriate action to prevent the outburst (see also box 
containing a summary of HALO Trust’s views, below and, in a separate box, a summary of a 
statement from UNMAS covering the same period).  
 
At the same time, it must be said that certain NGOs are notoriously difficult to coordinate, 
and resent UN interference in their affairs. Compounding this is the threat of competing 
demands for donor funds, with NGOs fearing that such funds may be channelled to the UN 
rather than to their own NGO activities.44 
 
Textbox 2 – Summary of HALO Trust Comments 
In responding to a questionnaire submitted by the Evaluation Team, HALO Trust expressed its deep frustration 
with the coordinating activities of UNMEE MACC before the issuance of Proclamation 123 in mid-2002. HALO’s 
representatives considered the MACC’s coordination efforts a failure. There were no UNMEE MACC or JMACC 
tasking plans, nor was there a viable tasking process. The UNMEE MACC did not focus on its primary mandate – 
coordination within the TSZ – but rather it attempted to develop capacity for a national programme without 
consulting others working in mine action, with overlapping intentions. HALO Trust found the relationship with the 
UNMEE MACC ‘highly irritating.’ It felt that the mine action process was not inclusive and, as a stakeholder in the 
process, it felt routinely ignored. For example, according to HALO Trust, monthly JMACC coordination meetings 
on purely operational issues started only in 2002, upon the initiative of HALO Trust. HALO Trust felt that 
‘coordination implicitly demands the coordinator to listen, discuss, argue, and demonstrate vision...Coordination is 
not about secrecy, arrogance, position, or control.’ 
 
The expulsion order by the Government of Eritrea reportedly came as no surprise. What was going to happen 
was ‘clearly sign posted.’ HALO Trust argued, immediately after the order, that the UNMEE MACC should return 
to its mandate. It argued, among other things, that EMAP (or by that stage EDA) could meet the challenge and 
‘did not need the UN-imposed UNMEE MACC to tell it how to do it.’ 
 
HALO does not believe that an Eritrean Government document exists – ‘appropriately dated’ – that empowered 
the MACC to build a national programme. UNMEE MACC ignored the fact that the Dutch Government assumed 
that it was doing some of this through a US$4 million programme with the HALO Trust and EMAP. ‘At the very 
least, why did the UNMEE MACC not consult formally with the HALO Trust and the Dutch Embassy?’  
 
HALO Trusts makes the comment: ‘Had the UNMEE MACC concentrated on coordination then we might all have 
achieved something…What happened instead is that the UNMEE MACC would appear to have concentrated on 
                                            
42 Notes to the members of Mine Action Support Group (MASG). Presented to the reinforced meeting 
on 5 September 2002 in New York. Page 3. 
43 This may represent more the benefits of hindsight than prescience, but HALO Trust programme 
manager did ask the HALO Director (who knew President Afworki personally) to come to Eritrea in 
August 2002, apparently because he saw trouble looming. Some representatives of other NGOs which 
worked closely with the MACC were taken by surprise by the expulsion, and questioned whether the 
MACC – which had greater access to the government – was effective in defending their programmes. 
44 The boxed statement from UNMAS indicates it has learned the lesson that coordination problems 
should be “quickly addressed in the future, by effective communication, compromise, and an inclusive 
approach with all partners”. 
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building a UN programme to a template that was simply inappropriate to the way mine action had and was 
evolving in Eritrea.’ HALO’s belief is that ‘when the Eritrean Government discovered that their national authority 
EMAP had allowed itself to be drawn into the UNMEE MACC process, they simply moved to close the whole 
show down’. 
 
HALO feels that ‘there was a failure to understand or demonstrate any passing understanding of the historical 
relationship between EPLF (the liberation movement that was the precursor to the Eritrean Government) and the 
UN…The UN is arguably not held in high regard by Eritrea for its actions in the 30 years after 1945’. 
 
Source: Comments by HALO Trust in response to a questionnaire by the evaluation team.  
 
Textbox 3 – Comments by UNMAS covering the same chain-of-events 
UNMAS addressed in particular the HALO allegations concerning “(1) what HALO saw as UNMAS’ 
unilateral decision to help build a national programme, and (2) the MACC’s poor effort in the area of 
coordination” which they see as integral elements of all UNMAS programmes.  
 
“While the extent of the landmine problem was not clear in 2000, it was widely recognized that it could 
not be resolved in a few years and that a national response would be required. This was agreed with 
the Eritrean authorities and included in the report that led to the establishment of UNMEE. The 
strategy was made operational with the assistance of the Commissioner of the Commission for 
Cooperation with the Peacekeeping Mission (CCPM) and the Deputy Commissioner for Mine Action, 
who was later appointed Director of the Eritrean Mine Action Programme (EMAP), and it formed the 
basis of signed agreements between the UN and the Government of Eritrea to support EMAP. This 
requirement for a national programme was also clearly stated by the Commissioner to the Mine Action 
Support Group in New York on 19 November 2001. The decision to develop a national programme, 
therefore, was not unilaterally taken by UNMAS. Significant capacity was developed by the MACC and 
NGO partners such as HALO during that period, capacity that has been an integral part of Eritrean 
mine action efforts under leadership of the Eritrean Demining Authority (EDA). 
 
On the issue of coordination, the comments of the two former HALO Programme Managers depict an 
ineffective and at times obstructive MACC. The clearance and MRE statistics, populated IMSMA 
database and quality assurance reports for that period tell a different story. Coordination in mine action 
is aimed at enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of activities by reducing duplication; providing a 
central point for information collation and analysis, requests for assistance and tasks prioritisation, 
based on availability and capability of assets; monitoring adherence to agreed standards; integrating 
activities; and interfacing with national authorities on mine-related issues. This is never easy or 
straightforward, given the number of competing requirements of the broad range of actors involved, 
including the government, UN organizations, donors, NGOs, and the local population. Therefore, it is 
inevitable that differences of opinion will arise from time to time. This was unfortunately the case in 
Eritrea between the UN and HALO Trust. The experience has taught a valuable lesson in ensuring 
that such problems are quickly addressed in the future, by effective communication, compromise, and 
an inclusive approach with all partners.” 
 
Source: Written comments submitted to the evaluation team in May, 2005. 
 
While there is some concordance between the HALO and UNMAS positions (e.g., both point 
to differences of opinion concerning coordination and to the need for speedy resolution of 
these in future), the common ground is scant relative to the ocean of difference. On some 
points the statements of the other NGOs appear to corroborate the allegations of HALO Trust. 
But these statements also convey a sense of betrayal that HALO Trust did not join in a 
coordinated effort to salvage a more acceptable outcome to the crisis, choosing instead to 
negotiate its own reprieve (plus an expansion of its programme). An individual familiar with 
MASG deliberations during the period offered the opinion that at least some of the important 
allegations made by HALO were, at their core, correct, but the tone of the correspondence 
from HALO, the personalised nature of some of the allegations, and the suspicions occasioned 
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by HALO’s announced expansion45 meant that the MASG members were loathe to press the 
issue, at least once they had assurances from the Eritrean government that it would not require 
the departing NGOs to turn-over their equipment and that future demining operations would 
be IMAS-compliant. 
 
Thus, there are seemingly few concrete repercussions within the wider mine action 
community to this traumatic and costly event, which in all probability has negatively affected 
the prospects of Eritreans living in, or seeking to return to, mine affected regions. One 
outcome was that the Director of UNMAS undertook to hold more regular dialogues with the 
international mine action NGOs, some of which coalesced into a more cohesive network that 
subsequently took on the name NGO Perspectives on the Debris of War. This continues to 
express concern over the role of UN agencies in coordination of mine action, emphasising 
largely the same points as were made following the expulsion order in Eritrea.46 
 
The evaluation team is not in a position to pronounce on how to allocate responsibility for 
failing to recognise and appropriately manage the risks to mine action activities in Eritrea 
during 2002. In part this is because the information provided47 does not ‘triangulate’, but 
more fundamentally because of the absence of direct input from Eritrean authorities regarding 
their perceptions and motivations at the time, or whether they felt their actions, in hindsight, 
were even based on accurate information.  
 
4.1.2 The period after mid-2002 
 
The Government of Eritrea issued a proclamation in mid-2002 thoroughly changing the mine 
action picture in the country.48 EMAP was dissolved, the Eritrean Demining Agency became 
EDO with only some slight staffing changes. The Eritrean Demining Authority was 
established, taking over from EMAP, and international NGOs were asked to leave. By the end 
of September that year, only HALO Trust remained (it left less than a year later) and the 
commercial company Ronco continued operations (and is still there). 
 
By order of the Government, all activities of MACC in support of EMAP stopped abruptly. 
Responsibility for UN capacity building shifted to UNDP and UNICEF. The departure of the 
NGOs also meant that the MACC’s coordinating responsibilities of humanitarian demining 
were no longer relevant, except in so far as UNMEE MACC’s own demining assets were 
concerned. With the loss of important humanitarian demining activities in the TSZ, and the 
serious curtailment of its responsibilities by the Government, the MACC had to re-examine its 
role. It did so without wasting time. 
 
                                            
45 HALO Trust explained that the government-imposed reduction in salaries within the mine action 
sector allowed it to engage more staff with its existing project budget. The expansion was never fully 
implemented. 
46 For example, “Our experience is that these MACs are confused in their role of responsibilities, have 
inadequate skills of personnel, are partially implementing, have insufficient oversight of field 
programmes and programme staff by New York, lack transparency and manage IMSMA incorrectly 
and unsustainably.” Presentation to the Resource Mobilisation Contact Group by Steven Olejas, 
DanChurchAid on behalf of the NGO Perspectives on the Debris of War, 10 February, 2004. 
47 Most was provided only after the Evaluation Report was “finalized”. Once again, the evaluation team 
originally did not intend to focus on the issues surrounding the expulsion order, and the Terms of 
Reference did not even provide for visits to the headquarters of the NGOs affected. 
48 Proclamation 123/2002, of July 8, 2002. 
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The MACC submitted a revised work plan which was approved by DPKO, UNMAS and 
UNMEE at the end of October, 2002. The following changes were implemented:49 
 
• The Quality Assurance (QA) section was amalgamated with the Operations section 
allowing the reduction of two international positions; 
• The Peacekeeping Force (PKF), Mine Awareness Cell (MACE) and Explosive 
Ordnance Disposal (EOD) officer and the UN Military Observers (UNMO) Mine 
Risk Education (MRE) cell were relocated to the MACC compound and combined 
with elements of the MACC Operations section to form the Force Mine Action 
Centre (FMAC); 
• The FMAC would be responsible for prioritisation and issuance of all UNMEE 
mine action tasks including demining, EOD and MRE tasks; 
• An EOD emergency response team was formed to conduct EOD training for the 
PKF EOD assets, and respond to major emergency EOD tasks within the TSZ; 
• Two MACC Regional Liaison Offices were established in the western and central 
sectors. The MACC staff in these offices assumed responsibility for all sector mine 
action coordination, QA and monitoring of any mine action activity within their 
sectors; 
• Two emergency MRE teams were recruited and deployed in sectors west and 
centre to work with PKF mine action operational elements working in those 
sectors; 
• Only indirect capacity building support would be provided by the MACC to the 
national program, and only through UNDP and UNICEF. 
 
It should be emphasized that: 
 
The revised MACC work plan was a creative and appropriate response to the 
unexpected and drastic decisions of the Eritrean Government in mid-2002. It resulted, in 
fact, in increased efficiency of UNMEE MACC operations by integrating military 
demining assets into a civilian-run mine action centre.  
 
The new work plan significantly had to limit the scope of activities of UNMEE MACC. 
Coordination of humanitarian demining was greatly reduced by the expulsion of NGOs and 
the intention of the Government to assume full control over mine action in the nation without 
UNMEE MACC’s help. The numerous details involved in mine action capacity building were 
shifted to the UNDP, with only support to EDA’s embryonic information technology, and 
medical support, left as MACC tasks. This shift left important spare capacity. With the current 
stalemate in boundary demarcation, not much action can be taken by the MACC beyond the 
continuation of access road clearance and activities related to demarcation.50 In short, then, 
we can say that the MACC’s wings were clipped in comparison to the first two-year period. 
 
During the period 2003 and 2004 noteworthy events included the replacement of UXB 
(because of a new requirement being identified for rapid route clearance) by Mechem. The 
latter, by all accounts, is one of the world’s top demining companies in its specific genre. 
UNOPS entered into a contract with Mechem for the period August 19, 2003 to April 7, 2004, 
                                            
49 Annual Report 2002, Emergency Mine Action Assistance in Eritrea and Ethiopia, MACC. 
50 Some of the tasks include, but are not limited to, reconnaissance, liaison with both countries military 
assets in the area of responsibility, vital training of PKF demining assets for the specific demarcation 
tasks, and clearance activities in areas calculated as possible pillar sites. 
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which has been extended since then. Mechem manages to clear some 15 km of road a day, 
less if the sensitivity of the sensors are adjusted to generate more signals. With the departure 
of the Slovak assets during the first half of 2004 (see Chapter 8), UNMEE agreed to utilize 
commercial mechanical support through UNOPS, instead of replacing the Slovak contingent 
with one from another TCC. UNOPS tendered a new contract and Mechem was awarded the 
extra work. The additional contract with Mechem was signed in September 2004 for the 
supply of four integrated demining teams, to be deployed in January 2005. UNOPS is to be 
commended for the selection process and its efficiency in concluding contractual 
arrangements. 
 
The Slovak demining contingent ceased operations at the end of May 2004 and departed the 
Mission area a month later. As the next chapter discusses in more detail, productivity of the 
Slovaks left much to be desired. The shift from a demining contingent to a commercial 
demining company (Mechem) turned out to be very cost-effective indeed (see Chapter 9). 
 
An important achievement was the establishment of a demining coordination centre in Shilalo 
in Sector West for the purpose of centralising and improving all operational, monitoring and 
training activities of PKF demining assets in the field.  
 
Quality assurance work was conducted on PKF demining assets, with mixed results as far as 
the Bangladeshi contingent is concerned (see chapter 8).  
 
The information section continued to develop its competence by creating add-on programmes 
to overcome deficiencies in IMSMA. It became a powerful support service to all mine action 
activities in the nation, especially the fledgling EDA, EDO, and the commercial deminers 
Ronco and Mechem (see Chapter 7).  
 
The two MACC MRE field teams were regularly deployed either to sector west or sector 
centre, and offered valuable assistance to a large number of communities residing in the TSZ, 
while supporting the operational tasks of the MACC EOD field team and the PKF demining 
teams. 
 
The Medical Coordination Cell of the MACC, staffed by a medical coordinator supplied by 
the Swedish Rescue Services Agency (SRSA) continues to ensure that the demining medical 
support capacity of all PKF demining contingents and MACC field operators – including the 
MACC EOD and MRE field teams and Mechem – is adequate. The work involves regular 
monitoring assessments and the conduct of various medical training courses. 
 
In-house training courses are organised by the MACC Training Cell under management of the 
Programme and Training Officer. The aim is to provide all MACC staff with opportunities to 
various training programmes planned and executed with selected staff participation, including 
computer training, report writing, a train-the-trainers HIV/AIDS course, human rights and 
conflict resolution, etc.   
 
Much useful work has been done during the last two years, but the scope of activities of 
UNMEE MAC has diminished (see Chapter 6 for staffing implications) compared to the 
period before the Government Proclamation 123 of July 8, 2002.   
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4.2 EDA and Mine Action Capacity Development 
 
UNDP support to mine action in Eritrea started with the arrival of the Chief Technical 
Advisor in February 2002, temporarily accommodated on the UNMEE MACC premises. 
Shortly thereafter the Senior Technical Advisor for the Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) 
arrived. Various agreements were signed in April, 2002 (the original MACBP project 
document, the agreement between UNDP and UNOPS, the agreement between UNDP and 
EMAP) and the capacity building in EMAP was initiated.51 
 
The issuance of Proclamation 123 in July 2002 contributed to the clarification of UNDP’s 
role. EMAP and the old EDA (1) ceased operations, and the UNDP’s task was now to support 
the new EDA. Progress appeared to have been fast judging from MACBP’s key milestones 
(Annex 2), in spite of the fact the new General Manager of the EDA was appointed only in 
October 2002.  The initial project document of MACBP was fully funded (approximately 
US$3 million), EDA staff was hired, equipment was ordered and put to use, some field 
equipment was transferred from the MACC to the EDO, training was provided in various 
areas, including MRE  and Quality Assurance, LIS national staff was selected and hired in the 
fall of 2002, and the LIS was launched (completed in June 2004), etc. Many achievements can 
be cited, including the launching of five effective demining teams working to IMAS in the 
central and western regions, effective support to victim assistance under the auspices of the 
Ministry of Labour and Human Welfare, the launching of operations of six MRE teams under 
auspices of UNICEF, support to the drafting and completion of a National Mine Action 
Strategic Plan (2005-2009), etc. An evaluation of the MACBP was conducted in August 
2004.52  The evaluation was supportive of MACBP, recommended broadening of Victim 
Assistance, called for better integration with national planning, recommended broadening of 
mine clearance resources (mechanical and dogs), and suggested that annual relief costs of 
keeping IDPs in camps are 2-3 times higher than demining costs.  Its final conclusions are: 
 
“The appraisal team feels that the UNDP MACBP has achieved much in very little time, with 
a paucity of resources, and that its role is crucial to the further growth and development of a 
national mine action capacity in Eritrea. A final consideration is that Eritrea, as a signatory 
to the Antipersonnel Mine Ban Convention, has put into place national policies and 
frameworks  to align itself to fulfil its obligations under article 6.3 and article 7 of the 
Convention, but requires the resources to do so”.53 
 
The arrival of the UNDP to help in the development of national mine action capacity was late, 
i.e. about two years after the cessation of hostilities. In the mean time, the MACC was 
engaged in providing support to EMAP, thus dividing a hectic period between supporting the 
Force on the one hand, and supporting an emerging national mine action capacity on the other 
hand. The efficiency with which the UNDP was able to launch a capacity development 
programme, and the early successes of this work, were in no small measure due to the 
capacity building efforts performed by the MACC and other mine action partners in previous 
years. People had been trained and were absorbed in the two newly created entities 
(EDA/EDO). Material and equipment were transferred from EMAP. Had it not been for the 
early capacity building work by international mine action organizations including the MACC 
                                            
51 See Annex 2 for a list of key milestones in the unfolding of the MACBP. 
52 An Appraisal of the UNDP Mine Action Capacity Building Programme in Eritrea,  by Dunne, Judith; 
Lindbaek, Espen; Haile, Dr.Tesfay; Teodonno, Raffaele; August 13, 2004 
53 Ibid, p.4 
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that benefited EMAP, progress of UNDP’s MACBP would most likely have been more 
modest. 
 
At least two lessons can be formulated: 
 
Capacity development support by a specialised agency should start immediately after 
cessation of hostility and the arrival of a peacekeeping force, not two years later. 
 
In countries with extensive contamination problems, mine action must have national 
ownership to be successful and sustainable. This also infers that demining should be 
included in national development plans as a pre-condition to achieve development goals. 
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Chapter 5 – Mine Action Financing  
 
5.1  UNMEE MACC Financial Resources 
 
As of today, the UNMEE MACC has received a total of US$18.4 million from the Assessed 
Contribution Budget, either on the basis of various UNOPS Memoranda of Understanding 
(MOU), or through UNMEE administered funding.  
 
In addition, the UNMEE MACC has been very successful in attracting contributions to the 
Voluntary Trust Fund, totalling US$5.1 million. The following tables provide some details. 
 
Table 1 – UNMEE MACC Mine Action Assessed Budget (US$000) 
Activity 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 Total 
UNOPS  MOU 
 
MACC Staffing 
Route Clearance Contract 
Mine Awareness Contract 
Integrated Demining Cont. 
Clearance for Demarcation 
UNOPS Mgt Fee 
Sub-total UNOPS MOU 
        0
        0
        0
        0
        0
        0
        0
1,187
1,200
       0
       0
       0




    90
      0






      0







  100 
3,256 
1,581 









UNMEE Direct Funds 
 
Mine detect. equipment 
Mine detect. supplies 
Mine detect. services 
Sub-total UNMEE 
 130











   73





   30 
  100 
    0 
  130 
   481
   535
716
 1,731
Grand Total   896 2,663 3,166 3,142 8,569 18,435
Source: UNMEE MACC 
* Partly offset by savings of some $5m by withdrawal of Slovaks 
 
Table 2 – Summary of Donor Support to the Voluntary Trust Fund (US$) 















  672,806 
  550,000 
  441,846 
  325,172 
  241,756 
  851,518 
  188,489 
  126,197 




Source: UNMAS finance section 
 
It is clear from the above figures that the Programme Manager has been singularly successful 
in attracting funds, sufficient to maintain current levels of activity. In Chapter 3, discussing 
the mandate of UNMEE MACC, the Evaluation Team recommended an enhanced role for the 
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MACC by tying its activities very closely to the basic objectives of the Force or Mission. 
Such enhancement would entail mine action activities in direct support of communities to 
gain the hearts and minds of the population, while deepening Force protection and mobility. 
Should this recommendation be accepted, an additional need for funds could be envisaged 
depending on the nature of the proposed enhancement, and on the weighing of a number of 
related factors. These factors include, but are not limited to: 
 
 The serious mine contamination in the TSZ, requiring focused action of increasing 
scope; 
 
 On the other hand, the fundamental change in the mandate of the UNMEE MACC 
after the Proclamation 123 in mid-2002, significantly reducing the scope of its work, 
notably by leaving mine action capacity building to the UNDP; 
 
 The possibility of obtaining additional funds (important here is the unique situation of 
the integrated UNMEE MACC that allows access to both the Assessed Budget, and 
the Voluntary Trust Fund);  
 
 The current stalemate with respect to final boundaries, a stalemate that has put further 
work on demining for demarcation to a virtual stop, work that may need to be re-
activated at a moment’s notice; and last but not least 
 
 Cooperation from EDA with respect to an enhanced mandate.54 
 
It is recommended that UNMEE MACC prepare a costed proposal for the further 
enhancement of its mine action activities that would accomplish the three-fold objective 
of Force protection, Force mobility, and community support designed to gain the hearts 
and minds of the population.55 
 
5.2  MACBP Financial Resources 
 
Although not a part of the evaluation’s Terms of Reference, it was nevertheless felt 
appropriate to provide some comments on the financial resources required by the MACBP. 
This would place into perspective the scope of required support for local capacity 
development. It also tends to underscore previous comments to the effect that capacity 
development is a task all unto its own, not to be confused, or mixed, with mine action in 
support of Force requirements.  
 
Cash flow requirements for the National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2005-2009 run at US$10-
13 million a year for the next five years (see table below). 
                                            
54 At the end of August 2004, an offer was extended to EDA by the MACC Programme Manager to 
assist in mine clearance operations to allow the return of approximately 19,000 IDPs to several 
villages in the Shilalo area. A request for assistance has subsequently been made by EDA.    
55 Subsequent to the evaluation mission, UNMAS and UNOPS contracted commercial organisations to 
provide mechanical and EDD assets in support of the Kenyan demining contingent, creating a 
combined commercial-military capacity. This is termed the Integrated Demining Contract (IDC), and is 
in line with our recommendation. More generally, we encourage UNMAS to update its analysis of the 
capacities required to meet the Force Commander’s objectives on a periodic basis, and give active 
consideration to alternative means for providing the requisite capacities in the most cost-effective 
manner. 
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Table 3 – National Mine Action Strategic Plan Cash Flow Requirements, (US$ m) 
National Strategic Objective 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Return of IDPs to 21 communities 
Clearance 116 H & M impacted communities 





















Total 10.3 13.2 13.2 13.1 13.5
Source: UNDP 
 
During the period immediately following Proclamation 123 in mid-2002, and the expulsion of 
mine action NGOs, the donor community was not greatly amused. Certain donors had 
invested substantial amounts of money in Eritrean demining activities, especially the Dutch, 
key sponsor of HALO Trust, and by far the largest contributor to Eritrea (see table in Annex 3 
for donor contributions). Their sponsored activities came largely to a halt, and there was not 
much inclination to invest in the country.  
 
Yet, donors are coming back. They are encouraged by indications of MACBP success, based 
on the findings of the August 2004 evaluation and discussions with the Chief Technical 
Advisor. During the past three years the following contributions were made (see table below). 
 














Memoranda items – other contributions 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
US (State Department) 
 
Technical advisors, vehicles and equipment 
EOD explosive charges 
US demining company Ronco fully funded  
*Not including in-kind contributions.  
Note: Leahy Foundation pledged US$500,000 bilateral MLHW for income generation; Canada support 
for CBR expansion under negotiation. 
Source: UNDP 
 
As the following table indicates, significant pledges have been made for the year 2005, but 
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Table 5 – Programme Resources Pledged to (UNDP) MACBP (US$ m)* 
Contributors 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Planned funding requirements 




EU (first balance LIS) 



















































Remaining to be mobilized  3.84 10.56 11.04 10.84 11.24
*Not including in-kind technical advisors and equipment donations from SIDA and Switzerland 
Source: UNDP 
 
In comparing the figures from UNMEE MACC on the one hand and MACBP on the other 
hand, one may make a hypothesis (to be confirmed by a more detailed cost-effectiveness 
analysis, see Chapter 9) that the establishment of national mine action capacity leads to 
significant advantages in terms of efficiency and effectiveness when compared to the costs 
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Chapter 6 – Mine Action Staffing 
 




The integration of the Mine Awareness Cell (MACE) and the UNMO MRE cell into the 
MACC and the formation of the Force Mine Action Centre (FMAC) enabled a joint 
military/civilian structure to focus in a coordinated fashion on tasking and deployment of 
assets. This integration resulted in the immediate reduction of seven UNMEE military staff 
positions by amalgamation of responsibilities.  Shortly after this new structure was created in 
the fall of 2002, another two Force positions were “disestablished” (Chief MACE and a Mine 
Awareness Warrant Officer) making it nine military positions that were eliminated. 
 
The FMAC was fully established and integrated with civilian personnel in the MACC 
compound in January 2003. FMAC consists of the following PKF military personnel:  MRE 
coordinator, MRE Officer, Kenyan Liaison Officer, Bangladeshi Liaison Officer, Clerk. In 
addition there are three military secondments from UN Military Observers (UNMO):  Mine 
Action Liaison Officer (MALO) based in Addis Ababa, a Project Officer Demining for 





In the fall of 2002, two existing QA Officer positions in the MACC were amalgamated into 
the Sector Regional Liaison Officers responsibilities, thus resulting in two MACC positions 
being declared redundant. This meant that the UNMEE MACC international staff came down 
from eleven positions before integration to nine after. Subsequently, a logistician was re-
deployed, making the current international core staff level of UNMEE MACC a total of ten.  
 
In addition there are 40 local staff engaged by the UNMEE MACC.  
 
UNOPS has signed Memoranda of Agreement with donors for the following in-kind 
positions: two EOD Officers (Swiss Ministry of Defence); an IMSMA Officer (Swedish 
Rescue Services Agency (SRSA)) shared with UNDP, and a Medical Coordinator (SRSA) 
also shared with UNDP.   
 
The ten core international positions are the following: Programme Manager, Chief of 
Operations, Chief of Finance and Administration, Chief of Information, Operations Officer,  
EOD Officer, Logistics Officer, two Regional Manager/QA Officers, and a Programme and 
Training Officer. 
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6.2 Staffing Issues 
 
Are current UNMEE MACC staffing levels appropriate? This question should be answered in 
terms of: 
 
(i) the need for essential competencies to be available (even if not fully utilised);   
(ii) the scope of responsibilities envisaged;  
(iii) the current workload; 
(iv) the degree of risk that can be accepted. 
 
There is also the need to determine what options exist for engaging local personnel rather than 
international staff, who cost many times more and whose benefit packages typically provide 
for significant periods away from their duty stations. 
 
Most mine action centres discharge a range of core functions, including: 
 
• operations planning and oversight 
• quality assurance 
• mine action information 
• finance and administration 
 
There may be other distinct functions, such as MRE in the case of the UNMEE MACC, that a 
MAC is required to perform. This range of functions, coupled with the limited number of 
Eritreans with extensive training and experience in performing these functions within a mine 
action programme intended to operate at international standards and the restrictions placed on 
Eritreans vis-à-vis Ethiopian territory within the TSZ, suggest a core complement of 
international staff of six, covering the following essential competencies – operations; QA; 
information management; finance and administration; and MRE; plus the overall manager. 
Additions to this complement of international staff need to be justified on other grounds.56 
 
Turning next to the scope of responsibilities, one issue in many programmes is the geographic 
scope of operations, particularly in areas with rudimentary transport systems. In this case, 
UNMEE MACC has established two regional offices (West and Centre), each headed by an 
international staff member. This seems reasonable provided operations actually are underway 
or planned for the near future (e.g. to support the border demarcation work).  
 
Another common issue relating to the scope of mine action operations relates to the range of 
munitions in the theatre of operations. There is a large variety of explosive remnants of war in 
the TSZ and adjacent areas, so provision for specialised EOD expertise appears reasonable. 
 
Once provision is made for the essential capacities to cover core functions, and for the scope 
of responsibilities, further additions to the international staffing complement must be justified 
by (i) workload or (ii) degree of risk aversion. As noted earlier, militaries generally have 
extremely low tolerances for risks to what are, or could become, mission critical functions. 
                                            
56 There is always the possibility of recruiting multi-skilled individuals to cover two or more of these 
essential competencies, but except for extremely small programmes this is generally not a satisfactory 
option for extended periods. 
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Therefore, military planners typically provide for significant redundancy in staffing, 
equipment, and so on, which is a major reason why the military provision of humanitarian 
assistance often costs many times more than civilian options. (OECD, 1998, Civilian and 
Military Means…, op cit., p.32) Governments in many TCCs also exhibit extreme risk 
aversion with respect to potential casualties among their troops serving on peacekeeping 
missions. The evaluation team acknowledges there will be an understandable predisposition 
toward low risk tolerance relating to UNMEE MACC affairs, and that this will affect staffing 
decisions. 
 
Turning now to workloads, a useful approach is to use other mine action programmes as 
benchmarks for comparison. The table below provides some very basic indicators57 for three 
mine action centres and programmes: (i) MACA in Afghanistan (a large and long established 
national programme); (ii) the MACC SL in South Lebanon (a closer match to UNMEE 
MACC, being fairly recent, connected to a peacekeeping operation, and responsible for a 
range of commercial assets plus a small military component – the Lebanese Armed Forces); 
and (iii) UNMEE MACC.  
 
















MACA  27 160 6,500 240:1 41:1 
MACC SL 7  22 400 57:1 18:1 
UNMEE 
MACC  10  40    201 20:1 5:1 
 
The case of MACA in Afghanistan illustrates the importance of economies of scale. With one 
central office in Kabul, and five regional offices throughout the country, the Afghanistan 
Mine Action Centre (MACA) employs 27 international staff and 160 national staff.58 Of those 
27 international staff, five are full time engaged in reconstruction work. Of the 160 local staff, 
15 are full time working on reconstruction. For the 12 month period 2004-05, tasks include: 
humanitarian mine action of 21.5 sq km, with 60% of funding covering mine action tasks and 
40% support to priority projects under tight deadlines. In addition, the programme includes 
battle area clearance of some 74 sq km, and surveys of some 30 km2. The total number of 
deminers under the programme is approximately 6,500. Thus, the ratio of deminers to 
international staff for the MACA in Afghanistan is 12 times higher than that for the MACC in 
Eritrea, and the ratio of deminers to local MAC staff in Afghanistan is eight times that of 
UNMEE MACC. 
 
In contrast, the mine action programme managed by the Mine Action Coordination Cell in 
South Lebanon (MACC SL) is significantly more modest, concentrating only on a region of a 
much small country (and mainly on the border minefields and former occupied villages in 
Southern Lebanon). MACC SL was responsible for demining funded by Operation Emirates 
Solidarity, under which two commercial firms (BACTEC, which fielded about 280 personnel 
                                            
57 Data on personnel numbers have been compiled from a variety of sources and, given the ebbs and 
flows in mine action programmes, are intended to be indicative rather than definitive as per any 
specific date. Those for Afghanistan relate to 2004; those for South Lebanon to 2003 when operations 
were in full swing. 
58 Source: United Nations mine action programme for Afghanistan, National Operational Work Plan 
2004/05, UN, 2004. Also data from a recent mission to Afghanistan by Ted Paterson, GICHD 
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along with dogs and a range of mechanical assets; and Mine Tech with over 100 personnel 
plus dogs and one machine) were engaged to conduct demining operations and an 
international NGO (MAG) was contracted to conduct surveys.59 In addition, 12 troops from 
the Lebanon Armed Forces were assigned to work under MACC SL guidance and a series of 
teams from the United Arab Emirates came for training in mine clearance and EOD. All told, 
the ratio of deminers per MAC staff members (international, local, or combined) in Southern 
Lebanon is about three times that for UNMEE MACC. 
 
These big differences do not automatically demonstrate excess staffing of the UNMEE 
MACC. Yet, the comparisons motivate one to seek ways to further reduce the staff 
complement. Improvement in economies of scale will have to be sought in: (i) a possible 
further re-structuring of combined FMAC and MACC positions (e.g. combining UNMO 
demining for demarcation positions with MACC operational positions, or possibly phasing 
out one MACC Regional Liaison Officer position); and (ii) enhancing the mandate of 
UNMEE MACC as suggested in Chapter 3. With the arrival of four integrated demining 
teams, such enhancement becomes a real option. 
 
At the current level of activity, it seems clear that two other international positions fall very 
much into the ‘nice to have’ rather than ‘need to have’ category. First, the Programme & 
Training Officer position appears responsible largely for reporting.60 This task has been 
discharged in a truly commendable fashion by the incumbent. However, the evaluation team 
is far from certain that detailed reports of all activities on a weekly basis are required to meet 
accountability and progress monitoring requirements. For these requirements, and recognising 
the time pressures on those receiving such reports, monthly reporting on an ‘exceptions 
basis’61 normally suffices. Detailed weekly reporting appears to serve more of a public 
relations function. Such a public relations effort may be warranted, but then the position 
should be justified on that basis rather than suggesting the weekly activity reports are required 
for operational or oversight purposes. 
 
Second, the UNMEE MACC organisation chart shows that the Operations Officer is 
responsible mainly for the coordination of the two regional TAs. Due to the current situation, 
with limited demining activities in the TSZ, it seems doubtful that this coordination role 
justifies a full- time position. The coordination could be covered by the Chief of Operations.62  
 
The evaluation team also notes that the option of training local personnel to assume roles 
played by international staff (i.e. individual capacity development) could be explored more 
aggressively by UNMAS for any programme that seems likely to endure for an extended 
period. This can lead to significant cost reductions of staff and to important enhancements to 
indigenous capacities within the overall mine action programme. 
                                            
59 Another commercial firm – Armour Group – was engaged to provide QA under the guidance of the 
UN QA Officer, and these international personnel are not reflected in the comparison. 
60 According to an UNMEE MAC document (Lessons learned since 2000), the deployment of a 
Programme Officer to the MACC in Asmara has enabled the UNMEE MACC to compile timely, 
comprehensive, and useful reports to UNMEE and to UN headquarters in New York, allowing the 
Programme Manager to focus on higher responsibilities such as policy and strategy. 
61 This simply means that no detail is provided concerning activities which are going according to plan; 
rather the focus is on ‘exceptions’ to the planned progress, with analysis of the causes for each 
deviation and the steps underway or envisaged to address any problems. 
62 Apparently, the Operations Officer stands in for the Chief of Operations during the latter’s absence. 
This ‘filling-up’ role can be taken over by the EOD Training Officer, who should have appropriate 
qualifications to serve at least temporarily as an Operations Officer. 




The big unknown in this whole matter is, of course, the resolution of the current border 
stalemate and hence the termination of the UNMEE mission. In spite of that, a close second 
look should be taken to further rationalise the staffing picture as much as possible (as was 
done in early 2004), while planning for enhancement of operations that would satisfy not only 
military requirements but also provide important development benefits to local communities.  
 
It is recommended to re-examine UNMEE MACC staffing options, including further 
staffing amalgamation options, and define a mine action programme that would enhance 
current activities by ensuring: (i) the satisfaction of military requirements; and (ii) the 
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Chapter 7 – Information Technology 
 
The UNMEE MACC has a Security Council mandate to facilitate mine action particularly 
"through exchanging and providing existing maps and any other relevant information to the 
United Nations" (Resolution 1344 [2001]). The establishment of an Information Section 
within the MACC as the central repository of all mine-related data in Eritrea, as well as the 
implementation and maintenance of a mine action database for Eritrea, fulfils this particular 
requirement. The Information Section is absolutely central to planning and implementing all 
mine action operations in Eritrea 
 
7.1  Basic Structure and Activities of the UNMEE MACC Information 
Section 
 
The Section consists of two international (one core staff and one in-kind staff) and five 
national staff members, and is housed in three offices in the MACC headquarters. One may 
identify seven distinct components of activity as follows: 
 
 IMSMA database, functioning as the national database in Eritrea. 
 GIS for mapping and to support IMSMA 
 "Add-on" data bases as a complement to IMSMA (for information where 
IMSMA is lacking, or to enhance existing features) 
 Support to the Field Administration Support System (FASS) 
 Other office support databases, such as "Expendables" (warehouse supply 
program for IT consumables, or "correspondence".  
 IT with network administration and network support, hardware and software 
installations, training, 
 IT office support. 
 
Of these components, IMSMA and GIS stand out. If these two systems are used and 
controlled properly, they can be fundamental and indispensable to all decision making related 
to mine action.  
 
The Section's main activity is the maintenance of all databases with a well-defined QA/QC 
scheme for all data. In addition, the Section is producing some 50-200 maps per month, a vast 
number of statistics and tables and provides support to the Operations Section for tasking 
MACC and UNMEE, as well as supporting external clients with maps (e.g. development 
agencies, NGOs, etc.) 
 
EDA has established an information section similar to the MACC. EDA is now capable of 
running IMSMA and GIS with most – if not all – data coming from the MACC systems. The 
main challenge here is to find, and appoint, a qualified local IT specialist to assure 
sustainability (see also Chapter 4). Currently work is in progress to establish an automatic 
procedure to synchronize the IMSMA databases and to have one updated national IMSMA 
database running simultaneously in both institutions. A distributed data entry (DDE) facility 
for this purpose is delivered with the system and has been in use with little or no problem for 
over two years in Lebanon, Chile, and in Afghanistan. The extensive local changes being 
performed are designed to allow the system to perform this function while providing EDA 
with access to just those data elements associated with its own territory. 
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GeoCell is the cartographic unit of UNMEE. It has a mapping capability similar to that of the 
MACC Information Section. There is an agreement between the two that standard topographic 
map production at the scales of 1:50,000 and 1:100,000 will be provided by GeoCell, while 
all mine-related maps and specific thematic maps will be printed by MACC. Both 





The Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) is a software-based data 
management tool for use at mine action centres. It includes a geographic information system 
(GIS) and can provide, if all goes well, up-to-date information to managers allowing them to 
plan, manage, report, and map demining related activities. 
 
It can be said that IMSMA is in the formative stage. It has experienced difficulties in the past, 
and UNMEE MACC has not been spared in this respect. In fact, a redesign of the system is 
being planned with the intention of ironing out problems that have been experienced.  The re-
design has been underway since August with planning and tendering processes started in 
2003. 
 
Looking at the IMSMA system as implemented in UNMEE MACC, the following positive 
observations can be made: 
 
o IMSMA has proven to be a most powerful tool in Eritrean mine action: it is 
fundamental to planning and tasking. UNMEE-MACC has greatly benefited from this 
tool, as have local authorities such as the EDA and EDO as well as other 
organizations. 
 
o The position of the Information Section within the UNMEE/MACC organisational 
structure is most appropriate. The section functions in a staff (advisory) position, 
supporting a number of users both within UNMEE/MACC and outside. Data entry is 
controlled by the Section for quality assurance, an essential condition of independence 
if the system is to maintain relevance and accuracy. Losing control over data entry 
(which might occur if the section were placed in a line position with data entry by 
various functional units) could seriously affect quality of output.63 
 
o A number of technical problems related to installation that have plagued the system 
have been resolved satisfactorily:  (i) distortion of polygons; (ii) problems of re-
installing IMSMA software; (iii) restoring the IMSMA database.  
 
                                            
63 Some people would argue in favour of allowing UNMEE MACC Operations to input data directly for 
enhanced operational control. This argument has merit, but could give rise to mistakes when different 
individuals with different functions input a multitude of different mine action statistics into a system that 
is notoriously complicated and very much in need of simplification. While, on balance in the opinion of 
the evaluation team, the situation in Eritrea calls for a separation between the Information Section and 
Operations because important mapping services are provided to external clients, this does not exclude 
the need for close cooperation between the two, given that Operations is the principal client.   
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Many problems have been corrected by updates to the system fielded in 2003 and others in 
early 2004. A number of technical challenges remain for IMSMA. They can generally be 
categorised as the growing pains of the system: 
 
o Problems not related to installation continue to exist: (i) the coordinates of the starting 
points of mined areas are (occasionally) recalculated by IMSMA in the wrong way; 
(ii) the export function works erratically (being corrected at the time of writing this 
report); (iii) there is, in the opinion of the Head of Information Technology, not 
sufficient consideration for quality control.64 
 
o A number of problems have been resolved through ‘add-ons’, intended to create 
functions desired by UNMEE. It is expected that these ‘add-ons’ will be removed as 
soon as the respective problems in the IMSMA system have been resolved. These 
‘add-ons’ are: (i) Progress databases (to overcome a perceived insufficiency of the 
progress reporting facility); (ii) Tasking database; (iii) Accident statistics; (iv) MRE 
statistics; and (v) LIS memo database. (See Box on following page for more detail.)65 
 
o Of particular importance in a peacekeeping mission is the ability of the system to 
identify cleared roads. IMSMA does not support ‘line features’ only ‘fields’. The 
system suffers, therefore, from a serious handicap in maintaining a database required 
by peacekeeping forces whose effectiveness is based on mobility. As long as this 
problem remains, an ‘add-on’ will be fully justified.66 
 
o The display of information in IMSMA-GIS is very rudimentary (e.g. the interface that 
allows more detailed information of a minefield by clicking on the respective point on 
a map).67 
 
In addition to the above technical challenges, an important operational improvement could 
be envisaged for IMSMA: 
 
o In order to facilitate access to the database by non-technical people, it would be useful 
to try to simplify the system significantly. Generally speaking, the simpler the system 
the more useful it becomes to others than only the hi-tech wizards. 
 
Preparation for hand-over of the system to local authorities: 
 
o In the long run, the IMSMA competence developed in UNMEE MACC will need to 
be transferred to the local EDA. At the moment the EDA and MACC exchange data 
once a week (as far as possible), and the latter then enters it into the system. Strategies 
will have to be devised by UNDP MACBP with MACC assistance and advice, to 
transfer the IMSMA competence to local authorities in order to be prepared for an 
eventual withdrawal of peacekeeping forces and the consequent de-mobilization of the 
UNMEE MACC.  
                                            
64 GICHD asserts that there are a number of facilities that address various aspects of quality control 
with respect to the content of the data base. 
65 Subsequent to writing this evaluation report, significant improvements have been introduced into the 
system allowing the removal of at least two ‘add-ons’, i.e. MRE and accident statistics. 
66 The system re-design includes a function specifically designed for this purpose 
67 GICHD asserts, in this respect, that local customization of the map displays is possible within the 
functionality provided by the ESRI GIS product ArcView 3.2.a or 3.3  
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While it is clear that IMSMA has provided a powerful means of data entry and retrieval, it is 
still a work in progress that requires improvement. The recent upgrading of the system 
(introduced after the present evaluation took place) has removed some important irritants. 
Recommendations emerging from the above description are self-evident, but will be 
formulated here as a concluding summary. 
 
In spite of important recent upgrades that now allow the system to operate relatively 
smoothly, work still needs to be done to resolve remaining technical problems, with 
particular emphasis on removing remaining ‘add-ons’, and facilitating ease of access by 
significantly simplifying the system. The installation of the latest version of IMSMA into 
the MACC system in December 2004 has obviated the need for many add-ons and has 
greatly enhanced the functionality of IMSMA for the MACC. 
 
Additional efforts will have to be made for handover of IMSMA expertise to the national 
authorities (EDA), an effort that requires full EDA participation (especially the 
recruitment and training of a competent IT specialist) and continued close cooperation 
between UNMEE MACC and UNDP MACBP. 
 






























(1) Progress Database 
- Easy entry, storage and retrieval of regular (weekly/monthly) demining activities 
(‘progress’) in terms of area (m2), road length (km) and cleared devices, grouped by 
company, defined for any selected time period.   
- Additionally, log monitoring system of demining activities to report, if a company did not 
work in a certain period. 
- Main target user is the Ops Section (developed to support Ops at follow-up of tasks). 
 
(2) Tasking Database 
- Easy entry, storage and listing of tasks, with interface to IMSMA. 
- Tasks can be printed in Gantt charts in different formats showing the completion rate, or 
listed with key data. 
- Locations are displayed in the ‘add-on’. Also transferable to GIS. 
- In addition, UXO, which have been reported and/or destroyed by EOD teams, are 
entered in a user-friendly way to generate tasking as well as completion report. 
- Main target user is the Ops Section (developed to support Ops at tasking) 
 
(3) Accident Statistics* 
- Data entry and retrieval module of data about accidents and victims in high compatibility 
with IMSMA. Data structure is compliant to IMSMA; user interface is very similar to 
IMSMA. Reports are designed to meet the needs of MACC Eritrea. Interface to GIS. 
- The particular data feature of mine accidents on roads has been added. 
 
(4) MRE Statistics* 
- Works as a report generator, i.e. the interface enables a user-friendly retrieval of MRE 
beneficiaries by selected period, with a breakdown by age, gender, and organization. 
 
(5) LIS Memo Database 
- IMSMA LIS tables do not allow storage of memo fields (long text). LIS was collecting 
long text data (comments, descriptions, survey problems, etc) in the field, which had to 
be entered to a database system. 
- The system is look-alike and feels similar to IMSMA. 
 
* Note: these two ‘add-ons’ have become redundant after a recent upgrade of the system took 
place some time after the evaluation occurred. 
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7.3 – Mapping 
 
The establishment of the MACC’s mapping facility has gone through a long and careful 
process. Based on old Russian maps (which proved to be off by some 1.6 km), GPS was 
applied correcting locations to some 5-20 meters accuracy and validating the locations of 
roads. With the introduction of LIS information, community locations were identified. The 
University of Bern created an entire new map set for Eritrea as part of the LIS project (at a 
cost of more than $200,000).  
 
The Information Section of UNMEE-MACC has succeeded in establishing a state of the art 
map production facility. The quality of maps being produced serve as a standard for the whole 
country. This is a great achievement!  
 
The marriage of IMSMA and maps works very well indeed. The maps are being used by the 
Government authorities and the international community with equal enthusiasm. Maps can be 
produced on very short notice and are freely available upon request (on average, some 50-200 
maps are produced a month). 
 
The ability to produce maps has now been introduced to EDA. The latter is now able to 
produce maps itself. This has contributed significantly to local mine action capacity 
development. 
 
The ability to produce state of the art maps, and the introduction of IMSMA data allowing for 
numerous permutations and combinations in map information, has proven fundamental in 





Final, August 2005 
 46 
Chapter 8 – Integration of Military Demining Assets 
 
8.1  Peacekeeping Military versus Civilian Role in Mine Action 
 
Wherever there is a mine and UXO problem, mine action initiatives require a high degree of 
cooperation between military personnel, civilian mine action staff and local authorities. 
Although initially intended for force protection and to ensure mobility, military demining 
capabilities, if properly directed and controlled, can bring important skills and organisational 
assets to complement activities more focused on community based mine action. Military 
organisations are normally trained to be mission orientated, and to complete these missions as 
quickly as possible. This works well for almost all military challenges, and indeed for many 
humanitarian problems like infrastructure repair. A study carried out by the Geneva 
International Centre for Humanitarian Demining concluded: “Military forces, both local and 
visiting, have made a significant contribution to mine action.”68 
 
At the same time, it is necessary to distinguish between tasks of a short-term nature and those 
institutional development activities requiring a long-term approach. Establishing national 
mine action programmes under post-conflict conditions requires long-term commitment that 
may continue long after the mission has completed its tasks. Right after a conflict, it is of 
great importance to gain an overview and a clear picture of the level of pollution in terms of 
landmines and UXO, and to use the data for priority setting and tasking of the demining 
assets. Development programmes are very much linked to demining efforts as they can only 
progress well in a safe environment. Therefore, a database on landmines and UXO 
contamination has to be set up and maintained properly from the beginning aiming to support 
long-term efforts. This requires technically qualified staff with long-term presence in the 
country. It calls for a civilian-run coordination body, as the military is not trained to deal with 
long-term mine action issues and related socio-economic aspects.  
 
8.2 Joint Assessment Mission  
 
Though small-scale humanitarian demining was carried out before UNMEE started its 
mission, no comprehensive information was available to assess the scope of the landmine 
problem in Eritrea and especially in the TSZ. 
 
The HALO Trust  conducted a so-called rapid survey right after the border conflict in 2000. It 
was focused for the most part on the former confrontation lines, but did not cover roads within 
today’s TSZ. As in most post conflict scenarios, there was a high likelihood of roads being 
mined by the conflict parties. The results of the HALO survey, therefore, gave only a rough 
idea of the pollution and certainly were not accurate enough to allow for a reliable assessment 
of the mine situation in the area of concern. 
 
The Security Council authorized the deployment of 4,200 troops to monitor the 1000 km long 
and 25 km wide TSZ along the provisional border which is known to be contaminated with 
landmines and UXO. Both Force protection as well as Force mobility became key concerns. 
                                            
68 Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, The Role of the Military in Mine Action, 
June 2003, page13 
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Suitable assets had to be selected and deployed to ensure safety for all UN staff, both on the 
roads and in fields used by the mission (e.g. compounds and areas around watch towers) 
Demining of key areas to support demarcation was not part of the mandate at that time.  
 
As safety of all UN staff is of utmost importance, the assets to be used and the demining 
procedures to be applied have to meet high quality standards.  
 
Assessment missions are of great significance as the mission approaches. Wrong or imprecise 
assessments may lead to wrong decisions and may affect the mission’s future operations, 
including efficiency and effectiveness factors. 
 
The Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) carried out in July 2000 proposed the deployment of 
road clearance assets and demining machines capable of preparing the ground for manual 
deminers and mine detection dogs if needed. Based on an agreement between the UN and the 
Troop Contributing Countries (TCC) the following mine clearance assets were deployed in 
early 2001.69  
 
Table 7 – Mine clearance Assets Deployed in Early 2001 
TCC 
 
Number of staff 
(all ranks) 
Mechanical equipment Other key assets 
Kenya            90  2 teams (45 deminers each), 40 
mine detectors 
Bangladesh            72 1 Aardvark medium flail 2 teams (36 deminers each), 4 
MDDs per team, 36 mine 
detectors, 
Slovakia         130 9 Bozena mini flails, 3 flail 




As the technical discussion below explains in more detail, some serious flaws were made in 
determining requirements. The mechanical assets deployed by the Slovaks, with the exception 
of one of the nine Bozenas,70 were not suitable to the country conditions even though they 
may have looked good on paper. A closer examination of geographic and weather conditions 
(poor road conditions, isolation in the rainy season complicating repairs, overheating of 
equipment in hot areas resulting in equipment breakdown) would have pointed to a selection 
of more appropriate mechanical assets. In addition to the inappropriateness of some of the 
mechanical assets, one may question the large number of such assets deployed (in total 13 
flail systems), especially since there was no clarity in the first Security Council Resolution 
concerning a humanitarian mine action mandate beyond relevant coordination and provision 
of technical advice (see chapter 3). 
 
Another serious problem of inefficiency resulted from the lack of integration of the TCC 
combined assets. A fully integrated set of assets, combining mechanical, manual, and dogs 
has strong potential to raise cost-effectiveness of demining. During the course of the mission, 
the advantages of integrated teams have been realized, and four such teams are currently 
being deployed.  
                                            
69 UNMEE MACC, Restructuring of the Demining Assets within UNMEE, page 4 
70 The Slovaks deployed eight Bozenas ‘2’ and one (more effective) Bozena ‘4’. Under a new and 
supplementary contract contract, Mechem operates four Bozenas ‘4’. 
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Experienced inefficiencies of TCC demining assets resulted from other factors. Of importance 
are the observed insufficiencies in maintaining appropriate mine action standards. As will be 
discussed below, the Bangladeshi demining contingent worked far below IMAS, thus 
presenting not only a danger to themselves but also raising questions about the safety of so-
called “cleared” areas. Furthermore, there is a problem of accountability: demining 
contingents are accountable to their own national governments; any requests by UNMEE 
MACC to improve performance (e.g. the Slovaks reportedly worked one and a half hour per 
day on average, managing to clear a mere 200 meters of road a day on average) would be of 
no avail.  
 
In the course of the last few years, it has also become clear that deployment of commercial 
demining assets as a supplement to TC assets provides much synergy to the overall mix of the 
demining effort. The work of the first commercial company (UXB), contracted for road 
clearance, was terminated because of a new requirement being identified for rapid route 
clearance. Its successor (Mechem) has proven itself to be a highly efficient outfit. In addition, 
there are very significant cost savings by using commercial assets as opposed to TCC assets 
(see Chapter 9) and the commercial company is much more controllable. 
 
A number of recommendations emerge from the above: 
 
A Joint Assessment Mission should include a highly experienced mine action specialist 
thoroughly familiar with force demining requirements as well as demining in 
accordance with IMAS. The specialist should also have a sound knowledge of all 
demining technologies available and their appropriate application. DPKO may have to 
fall back on external expertise to cover the whole range of aspects. 
 
The need for a judicious mix of demining assets will need to be anticipated right at the 
start of the mission, based on  
 
(i) a clear definition of tasks expected to be performed, combined with a liberal 
rather than a narrow interpretation of the Security Council Resolution 
defining the mandate;  
 
(ii)  the realization that there is a considerable dual benefit of demining 
accruing to both the military and the affected communities; and  
 
(iii) the significant scope that exists to supplement and/or complement 
traditional contingent demining assets with commercial demining assets. 
 
DPKO needs to institutionalise the authority and competence to negotiate with TCC in 
order to ensure the best contribution suited to circumstances. UNMAS could play an 
important role in this respect. 
 
The determination of the right assets during the Joint Assessment Mission also has important 
implications for the source of funding. It allows for a more considered inclusion of 
anticipated expenditures into the Assessed Budget, rather than having to rely on subsequent 
contributions to the Voluntary Trust Fund.  This suggests the following recommendation: 
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The Assessed Budget should include a well-considered mix of expenditures that takes 
into account the natural unfolding of demining activities that normally change 
significantly when the mission moves from an emergency state to a state of stability.  
 
8.3 Assessment of Assets Deployed to Eritrea  
 
8.3.1 Mechanical equipment 
 
The military road clearance equipment deployed to Eritrea by the TCCs was not suitable to 
meet safety and clearance requirements. Military demining equipment, especially when it is 
exclusively designed to breach minefields in a combat situation, is not reliable enough to clear 
areas to a level that is demanded by International Mine Action Standards. 
 
(i)  Roller systems  
 
Roller systems attached to main battle tanks, such as the KMT system, are designed to breach 
paths into minefields in combat situations, but not to clear roads to a standard demanded by 
IMAS. The disc array in front of the tank covers only a small area of the road to be treated. 
Therefore, several runs are necessary to cover the whole road and the roadside, if considered 
necessary. A required overlap to ensure a full coverage of the ground in a specified area is 
hard to achieve, especially on curves in the road. Additionally, roller systems are proven to be 
unreliable on uneven ground as areas may not be treated by the disc and therefore mines do 
not detonate as intended. From January 2002 to October 2002 the Slovaks treated only 317 
km of roads with their roller systems. Compared to that the civilian contractor MECHEM 
cleared 1,662 kilometres of road within 9 months in 200471.  
 
Road clearance is known to be technically difficult and time consuming, no matter what sort 
of mines are likely to be encountered. Both, the humanitarian demining community and the 
military still have to rely on either the use of MDD or on vehicle mounted metal detection 
systems. Other technologies such as ground penetrating radar are still premature to be fielded. 
Even most of the NATO forces, which are reputedly better equipped than many armies from 
developing countries have currently no sufficient answer to respond to this particular 
challenge.  
 
During the last decade mine action has developed quickly. A great many studies have been 
carried out leading to enhanced productivity, highest safety standards and consideration of 
socio-economic aspects. The UNMEE MACC as the coordination body has to be given the 
mandate to use equipment that has the technical potential to ensure the highest possible level 
of clearance, as otherwise safety of UN staff (and civilians for that matter) cannot be 
guaranteed. 
 
                                            
71 UNMEE MACC, Demining Progress Statistics, 01 January 2004 – 31 October 2004, 01 January 
2002 – 31 December 2002 
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Figure 1 – T 55 tank roller operating in Eritrea 
 
The decision made by the MACC in late 2002 to contract a commercial company for road 
clearance was the right one as the military assets did not have the technical potential to ensure 
a high level of safety and clearance performance. The increase of productivity, and 
consequently of safety for mission staff, can be deduced from the graph shown on the 
following page. 
 
Final, August 2005 
 51 











































































































Final, August 2005 
52 
 
(iii) Heavy flail systems  
 
Heavy flail systems, such as the Belarty (see picture below) that are based on a battle tank 
chassis, have never been tested impartially and independently as they are not commonly used 
for humanitarian mine clearance purposes. Therefore, the clearance performance of such 
systems has not been properly evaluated. However, experience shows that the running costs of 
heavy machinery such as battle tanks (fuel, oil, lubricants) are extremely high and their 
technical complexity often causes downtime, which makes them unsuitable for large scale 
demining operations. Poor road conditions in developing countries make transportability of a 
30 tonne machine difficult; sometimes even impossible.  
 
Therefore their suitability for operations in developing countries is considered to be very 
limited. Many kinds of flail systems are not applicable to road clearance as their working 
tools destroy the surface of dirt roads. Their main purpose is to prepare the ground aiming to 
support manual deminers or mine detection dogs (MDD). Clearance statistics provided by the 
MACC do not show the actual use of this particular machine type, as they exclusively display 




Figure 2 – UOS 155 Belarty 
 
(iv) Bozena mini flail 
 
The system has been independently and impartially tested by the Croatian Mine Action Centre 
(CROMAC) in January 2002 and basically is proven to be a valuable asset for ground 
preparation to assist operations carried out by manual deminers and mine detection dogs 
(MDD). The Bozena is not a stand-alone mine clearance asset, which means that the area 
treated by the machine has to be searched either by dogs or manual deminers.  
 
According to the CROMAC test report, the Bozena has an average productivity of 300 to 500 
m2 per hour, depending on soil conditions, type of vegetation encountered, and level of mine 
contamination.72 Low running costs and ease of logistic support and transport (5,500 kg) 
make the system suitable in many situations. 
 
                                            
72 Republic of Croatia, Croatian Mine Action Centre, Testing of Bozena 3 Mine Clearance Machine, 
January 2002, page 33 
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However, dry and hard soil conditions may cause technical problems to the machine and 
require modifications; especially with regard to the cooling system. The particular 
environment encountered in the operational area has to be assessed properly prior the 
deployment of equipment in order to avoid excessive downtime.  
 
The soil conditions in the areas visited by the evaluation team (Shilalo-Sector West) allow the 
use of the Bozena for ground preparation. The suitability of the machine for clearing the pillar 
sites in other areas cannot be evaluated as there may be other soil conditions to be 
encountered. 
 
The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) agreed with the Slovakian Government 
on the deployment of nine Bozena mini flails to Eritrea. Their theoretical daily output (5 
working hours/400m2 per hour per machine) is 18,000m2. Assuming the machines were 
operational five days a week and 50 weeks per year, roughly 4,500,000m2 could have been 
treated. However, according to UNMEE MACC progress statistics for 2003, the Slovakian 
contingent treated only 687,918 m2 of ground. This figure possibly includes an unknown area 
treated by the 3 Belarty systems. The figures show that the machines were extensively under-
utilized, at high opportunity costs. The decision made in 2000 to deploy 12 flail systems does 
not seem reasonable considering the vast degree of under-utilisation.  
 
The UNMEE MACC is going to start a demining project called “integrated demining” in 
early 2005. After the withdrawal of the Slovakian contingent, there are no ground preparation 
systems left in Eritrea. UNMEE MACC, therefore, decided to contract MECHEM for ground 
preparation using four Bozena mini flails and to combine these systems with manual deminers 
and, optionally, with mine detection dogs. This approach seems to be reasonable and the local 




Figure 3 – Remotely controlled Bozena mini flail 
 
(v) Aardvark flail system 
 
The Aardvark is a mechanical mine clearance system mainly in service with the military. It is 
proven to be a valuable asset when used in the right environment and under appropriate 
circumstances.73 However, the mass of the vehicle (roughly 15 tonnes) requires a low-bed 
trailer for transportation and an appropriate road infrastructure, which can be found only in a 
few areas of Eritrea. This has to be taken into account prior to deployment. MACC staff 
                                            
73 United States Army, Communications- Electronic Command Research, Development and 
Engineering Centre, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, Capabilities Demonstration Test Report, January 2002 
Final, August 2005 
54 
pointed out that the Bangladeshi contingent had no appropriate transport vehicle to ensure the 
deployment of their demining machine to the demining sites as required. In 2003 the 
Aardvark was only operational for seven hours in total and treated not more than 2,400 m2,74 
an area that can normally be done by a comparable machine in one day. 
 
 
Figure 4 – Ardvark on a low bed trailer. 
The mass of this vehicle leads to difficult transport on dirt roads. 
 
All demining organisations, whether military or civilian, acting under UN umbrella in a 
defined area of responsibility must follow mine action standards that are derived from IMAS. 
The equipment applied must have the technical potential to achieve full clearance. 
Unfortunately, many military forces are not equipped to carry out large-scale road clearance 
operations leading to results that come up to IMAS. 
 
The following recommendations are offered:  
 
Military demining assets offered by TCCs have to be assessed accurately prior their 
deployment with the prospect of their potential utilisation, clearance performance, 
suitability for the particular environment, and cost-effectiveness.  
 
DPKO should arrange for a review of the use of the assets deployed to a mission after 
one year aiming to do adjustments, if necessary.  
 
The use of commercial assets should be considered an option from the beginning of a 
mission, if the security situation allows. 
8.3.2 Demining equipment and procedures of military demining units 
 
Demining aims to identify and remove or destroy all mine and UXO hazards from a specified 
area to a specified depth. For buried landmines and UXO this depth should normally not be 
less than 13 centimetres below the original surface level.75 The figure is based on the effective 
                                            
74 United Nations, Office of Internal Oversight Services, Internal Audit Division-1, 29 September 2004 
75 International Mine Action Standards. Series 9 
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detection depth of the majority of modern metal detectors. This means that the equipment 
used by both civilian and military demining teams has to ensure a performance, which meets 
this internationally, agreed standard.  
 
The beneficiaries of demining operations, regardless whether they are mission staff or local 
population, must be confident that cleared land is safe for their use. Equipment and 
operational procedures applied by the demining units – both military and civilian – have to 
meet this requirement.  
 
The evaluation team visited demining operations carried out by the Kenyan and Bangladeshi 
contingents in Shilalo, Sector West. Both units conducted tasks given by the MACC through 
the FMAC and seemed to be highly motivated. However, there was a significant gap between 
the two contingents with regards to working procedures, equipment and understanding of 
safety requirements. 
 
The Kenyan demining units were trained by British experts in Nairobi prior to their 
deployment. They apply working procedures that are in line with IMAS (for instance 
appropriate safety distances between deminers and set up of the demining site). Their personal 
protective equipment is “state of the art” and meets all safety requirements for the demining 
staff. MACC staff stressed that deminers encounter highly mineralised soil in the Shilalo area 
that seriously affects metal detectors. Therefore the metal detectors used have to be of high 
quality. Only modern models have been proved to have the feature to compensate for soil 
conditions with minimal loss of target sensitivity. The Minelab model used by the Kenyans 
has been tested independently and impartially by various organisations and performed 
generally well. It can be concluded that the Kenyan deminers achieve clearance standards 
demanded by IMAS and their working procedures in conjunction with their protective 
equipment ensure a high level of safety for the staff. Their relative productivity under the 
prevailing conditions cannot be judged as there are no other operating units using manual 
methods only. 
 
By contrast, the Bangladeshi deminers apply purely military methods that do not correspond 
to the latest knowledge on safe and effective demining.  
 
 
Figure 5 – Bangladeshi deminers conducting “road clearance” in the Shilalo area 
The clearance methods applied should guarantee a high level of safety for the deminers. The 
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personal protective equipment (flak jackets, skiing goggles) are only three examples showing 
deficiencies with respect to internationally agreed safety standards. 
 
As displayed on the picture above, the Bangladeshi contingent does not use base sticks or 
markings to ensure that the whole area searched is covered entirely as demanded. The 
performance and the suitability of their metal detectors is at least questionable as it is an old 
model (METEX 4122/4125, produced by Institute Dr. Foerster – Germany) which has no 
“ground compensation” system to compensate for highly mineralised soil and would therefore 
have difficulties to perform well under the conditions encountered in the Shilalo area.  
 
The MACC operations branch has been aware that the performance of the Bangladeshi 
deminers is not appropriate to meet necessary requirements. “As we have till now not had the 
confidence in the clearance we have only allowed the Bangladeshi to demine low risk road 
tasks where the likelihood of mines is low and the verges of roads where only high metal 
content AT mines have been found. We do not record the roads cleared by the Bangladeshi as 
cleared until the route clearance contractor has also cleared them”.76  
 
In this context UNMEE MACC commented in 2003 on the dangers of “…demining in purely 
military methods, leaving behind questions of cleared land as a result of poor marking and 
demining processes”77. The paper was disseminated to DPKO, UNMAS and the UNMEE 
force in 2003 apparently without leading to any changes.  
 
The International Mine Action Standards are issued by the United Nations to guide planning, 
implementation and management of mine action programmes. The work of preparing, 
reviewing and revising these standards has been conducted by technical committees with the 
support of international organizations, governmental bodies and NGOs. They have been 
developed to improve safety and efficiency in mine action, and to guarantee the full clearance 
of potentially affected land. The IMAS cover a wide range of issues from the accreditation of 
mine detection dogs (MDD) to medical support for demining staff, from safety and 
occupational health to survey, from sampling of cleared land to storage and transport of 
explosives. They are well accepted by the international demining community and serve as the 
common ground, as they are based on relevant experiences gained from all over the world and 
latest research results. The UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping has specifically 
recommended that troop-contributing countries follow national and international standards for 
mine action, including IMAS.78 
 
The Bangladeshi contingent started demining operations in 2001 and according to UNMEE 
MACC they have cleared manually 1,726,868 m2 of land so far.79 This does not include 1,146 
kilometres of road treated by them since 2001. Due to the inadequate methods used during the 
last four years, the status of the area cleared is questionable and the gain for either the local 
population or the Force is debatable at best.  
 
                                            
76 David Bax, chief of operations UNMEE MACC, e-mail to Johannes Dirscherl, 19 November 2004 
77 UNMEE MACC, Restructuring of Demining Assets within UNMEE, page 5 
78 See the section on mine action in the fifty-seventh session of the C34 Comprehensive Review of 
Peacekeeping, paras. 145-149. 
79 Demining Progress Statistics January 2001-October 2004 
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If it is the Force policy to win the hearts and minds of the local population,80 the use of 
military demining assets can be a valuable contribution to this end. However, an accident in 
an area previously cleared by UNMEE deminers would certainly be counterproductive and 
has to be avoided.  
 
The issue was raised by the evaluation team during a discussion with the Force Commander. 
It resulted in a decision to train the Bangladeshi contingent and introduce higher standards to 
their operation. The evaluation team is not aware of any reason as to why such a decision was 
not made when these marginal standards became known shortly after the deployment of the 
Bangladeshi contingent.  Even if the MACC and the Force Commander did not have the 
mandate to influence the operating procedures of demining contingents, the potentially 
serious impact on the Mission should have raised alarm. 
 
All demining organisations, no matter whether they are military, commercial or civilian, 
acting under a UN umbrella in a defined area of responsibility must follow mine action 
standards that are derived from IMAS. The equipment applied must have the technical 
potential to achieve full clearance. 
 
The UNMEE MACC may have to consider clearing the Bangladeshi areas again using a 
commercial company to ensure full safety, or at least to carry out a comprehensive threat 
assessment in order to decide on further action.  
 
The following recommendations emerge: 
 
Demining staff intended to be used in the UN area of responsibility must be trained, 
prior to deployment, to apply international mine action standards.  
 
UNMAS may wish to consider quality assuring existing regional mine action training 
centres for future training purposes of TCC contingents. 
 
Donors should be requested to contribute equipment and training to improve the 
standard of demining assets. 
                                            
80 Force Commander Major General Singh, interview with the evaluation team, … 
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Graph 2 – Area Clearance in the Temporary Security Zone 
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Chapter 9 – Cost-Effectiveness Analysis 
 
9.1 Comparison of Military and Civilian Demining Units 
 
The TORs list the following as one of the three goals of the evaluation: 
 
Provide a cost benefit analysis of peacekeeping demining versus commercial 
demining in support of a security council mandate. 
 
The GICHD proposal incorporated the following to elaborate our understanding of 
what was required and feasible: 
 
A comparative cost-benefit or, more likely, cost-effectiveness analysis of demining in 
support of a Security Council mandate performed by (i) peacekeeping forces and (ii) 
commercial firms, together with a comparative assessment of the two types of 
demining service providers in terms of other relevant performance criteria (access, 
flexibility, safety, timeliness of availability, capacity to deliver integrated mine action 
services, etc.). 
 
Cost-Effectiveness Analysis is part of the broader family of analytic techniques 
termed Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA), which are used to compare inputs into a 
production system (such as a demining service) relative to the goods and services 
produced by that system. The goods and services produced can be assessed at the 
point of immediate outputs (for demining, areas surveyed or cleared, lengths of road 
surveyed or cleared, devices destroyed, etc.) or outcomes – how the people receiving 
the outputs actually make use of them (e.g. planting crops on the areas cleared, 
travelling on the roads cleared, etc.) for their benefit. 
 
Full CBA can be done when four conditions are met:  
 
i. a reasonably complete and accurate set of data on the quantities of resource 
inputs, 
ii. a reasonable basis for determining the financial costs of those inputs, 
iii. a reasonably complete and accurate set of data on the quantity of outputs (and, 
if possible, outcomes), and  
iv. a reasonable basis for determining the financial value of the outputs/outcomes.  
 
While problems may arise in obtaining or determining any of these data, satisfying the 
third and fourth conditions is generally challenging. In meeting the third condition 
(quantities of outputs), we need to ensure we are comparing similar outputs. There are 
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Table 8 – Common Problems in Comparing Productivity Figures 
Problem Examples of errors 
Apples versus Oranges 
(comparing dissimilar things) 
Comparing suspected hazards rendered safe by (i) 
combined survey and clearance versus (ii) full clearance. 
Apples versus rotten apples 
(dissimilar quality of 
clearance) 
Comparing areas cleared to high (or humanitarian) 
standards versus areas cleared to a level of “acceptable” 
risk (e.g. breaching) 
Apples versus mixed fruit 
(dissimilar numbers of 
benefits) 
Comparing single capacity units (e.g. demining) versus 
multiple capacity units (e.g. demining and peacekeeping) 
 
Meeting the fourth condition (value of outputs) is particularly challenging when the 
outputs lead in turn to benefits which are intangible (such as an enhanced sense of 
security for civilians or for peacekeeping troops) or which are not comfortably 
expressed in financial terms (such as the value of lives and limbs saved). Thus, for 
demining, one may be able to determine values for cleared land, buildings, roads, etc. 
based on the market value or the value of future production made possible by the 
clearance, but some of the benefits – security; lives and limbs saved – are not easily 
reduced to financial terms. In some mine action situations, it is precisely these 
intangible or non-financial benefits that are the most important. 
 
When only the final condition (financial values of outputs/outcomes) is not met, Cost-
Effectiveness Analysis (CEA) can be used to compare the cost of producing the same 
set of outputs using different organisations, clearance assets, and so on. However, 
using CEA in a rigorous fashion to produce a clear and unambiguous result still 
requires that the first three conditions are met to a reasonable degree at least. Often – 
as in this case – some data are missing or ambiguous. Good practice then entails (i) 
identifying the data questions or problems, (ii) making reasonable assumptions for 
how to address these and stating these assumptions clearly, and (iii) testing to assess 
whether the results obtained are sensitive to reasonable changes in the assumptions 
employed. 
 
9.1.1 Data Problems and Questions 
 
There are good data to meet the first two conditions: (i) the quantities of resource 
inputs and (ii) their costs to UNMEE. There are however problems in meeting the 
third condition (quantities of outputs). We need to guard against the three errors 
outlined in the previous table, but more fundamentally there are serious discrepancies 
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Table 9 – Serious Data Discrepancies 
Data Source IMSMA data81 Annual Report 03 Audit Report 
Area cleared m2 – 2003 
 Slovak 1,120,740 1,634,975 385,682 or 1,282,033 
or 1,667,71582
 Bangladeshi 784,996 1,576,874 1,310,563
 Kenyan 55,868 104,611 102,620
 Ronco 2,754,528 7,208,758 N/A
Road cleared km – 2003 
 Slovak 91 274 N/A
 Bangladeshi 651 263 N/A
 Kenyan 13 0 N/A
 MECHEM 791 649 N/A
 
Discrepancies of this magnitude mean that CEA calculations for even the simplest 




Based on advice from the Head of the MACC Information Section, we have used the 
IMSMA data. 
 
The second problem is that (at least) two different types of demining outputs are being 
produced, and these are measured in different ways: 
 
1. areas cleared (measured in square metres) 
2. roads cleared (measured in linear kilometres) 
 
This is not a problem when comparing like-with-like, but creates a problem of the 
“apples versus mixed fruit” sort when comparing a unit engaged to produce a single 
type of output (such as MECEM, contracted for road survey and clearance alone) with 
a unit producing two types of outputs (such as the Slovak contingent, as depicted 
below) unless we have reliable data on which assets worked on which type of task and 
for how long. We do not have these data. 
 
                                            
81 From file Copy of Statstics_2003-2004.xls 
82 Table 2 on page 4 of the Audit Report gives separate figures for clearance by manual 
deminers (385,682 m2) and by mechanical assets (1,282,033 m2). The mechanical assets 
available to the Slovak contingents are not capable of clearing roads or areas to acceptable 
standards. The T55s with rollers can do risk-reduction on roads, while the flails can do ground 
preparation. Further, it is unclear whether the Slovaks did manual clearance on land that had 
already been prepared by machines, or worked on entirely separate hazards. 
CEA 
Inputs (in $) Demining Outputs 
(quantities) 




A closely related issue in the case of Eritrea is the fact that, inherently, military 
demining units offer additional benefits. If necessary, they can be pressed into other 
tasks to support the mandate of the peacekeeping mission (peacekeeping, civil 
construction works, etc.). They are also equipped to defend themselves and can be 
deployed in situations in which the presence of civilian contractors would be 
inappropriate or politically unacceptable. Their military capabilities – even if never 
called upon – are available to the force commander as a reserve, allowing more active 
use of other contingents. These capabilities are valuable (and a cost estimate is 
provided later in this chapter). Therefore, the “production” of the Slovak, 
Bangladeshi, or Kenyan demining contingents might be more correctly depicted as in 






We have adequate data for a good comparison between a military demining 
contingent (the Kenyans) and a commercial demining firm for both calendar year 
2003 and (with somewhat more confidence) the U.S. fiscal year 2004 (1 October 2003 
to 30 September 2004). The calculations are summarised below and depicted in the 
graph on the following page. 
 
Table 10 – Cost-Effectiveness Calculations for Area Clearance 
 m2 $ $/m2 Ratio 
Kenyan 2003 55,868 $2,626,054 $47.00 
Ronco 2003 2,754,528 $2,163,000 $0.79 59.86:1 
     
Kenyan FY 04 170,071 $2,626,054 $15.44 
Ronco FY 04 2,363,415 $1,452,000 $0.61 25.13:1 
Notes: Area cleared figures from IMSMA (Copy of Statstics_2003-2004.xls). Costs for 
Kenyans from memo ‘Possibility of purchasing Slovak COE’ by Sergiy Mazurov, (minor re-
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We should note that Ronco uses MDDs in support of its manual teams. Depending on 
weather and ground conditions, the support of MDDs can significantly enhance the 
productivity of manual deminers.83 While this is not an issue from the perspective of 
cost-effectiveness, it would be possible to decompose the cost-effectiveness 
advantage of Ronco into two components: (i) better mix of assets and (ii) better 
‘management’ of assets.84 For example, if we determined that Ronco was 25 times as 
cost-effective as the Kenyans (equal to the ‘best case’ figures for 2004), and that 
MDDs increased the cost-effectiveness of manual teams by two-thirds (about 67%) on 
average, the decomposition would give: 
 
Total difference = different asset mix * different management 
2500% = 167%  * different management 
different management = 2500%/167% = 15 (i.e. 15 times as cost-effective) 
 
Thus, the bulk of the cost-effectiveness ‘advantage’ stems from different management 




1. Both the Kenyan and Ronco clearance SOPs are IMAS compliant, so safety 
for deminers, peacekeeping troops, and civilian populations is comparable. 
2. Kenyan forces have military capabilities. 
 
















                                            
83 MDDs particularly enhance productivity of manual teams when there is high metal content 
in the soil. This significantly slows manual clearance as the metal fragments give many ‘false 
positive’ readings with metal detectors.  
84 Of course, we do not mean to imply the Kenyan officers or others in the Force chain of 
command are bad managers. We have not studied this question in detail and are in no 
position to make a pronouncement. It does seem reasonable to conclude that military forces 
and their officers face very different incentives than do commercial firms and managers and – 
put simply – the top priority of military officers is not to maximise the cost-effectiveness of 





















Best Case Worst Case
Military
Commercial






We have comparable IMSMA data for production for MECHEM and the Slovak 
demining units. We also have solid cost data for both organisations. However, the 
Slovak units also conduct area clearance operations (both clearance and ground 
preparation by machine) and civil engineering works. We do not have detailed data on 
which Slovak assets were assigned to which tasks, so cannot allocate the total costs 
for the Slovak contingent with confidence. Therefore, we have compiled “best case” 
and “worst case” figures (from the Slovak perspective): 
 
Best case – We assume that only the assets specifically designed for road clearance 
(albeit, not in compliance with IMAS) and the minimum necessary troops and 
supporting assets are charged to road clearance, along with a contribution to 
overheads based on the numbers of troops. Specifically, the “Road Clearance 
Package” of assets and associated costs are: 
 
Table 11 – Minimum costs of Slovak Road Clearance Capacities 
Item Unit cost/mo. Units Cost/month 
Tanks, mine clearing $8,477.00 4 $35,630.00 
Roller system for tanks $1,422.00 4 $6,003.00 
Ambulances $4,727.00 4 $19,828.00 
Troops & leader for above $1,181.93 19 $22,456.73 
Supporting  $1,181.93 5 $5,909.67 
Petrol, oil, lubricants   $18,000.00 
Total, direct costs of Road clearance package $107,827.40 
All other costs for Slovak contingent $715,634.91 
Allocation of other costs (36 troops/200 troops * cost) $85,876.19 
Total costs/month, Road clearance package $193,703.59 
Annual total costs, Road clearance package $2,324,443.07 
Notes: Cost figures from data in memo ‘Possibility of purchasing Slovak COE’ by 
Sergiy Mazurov, with supplemental calculations by T. Paterson. 
 
Worst case: All road clearance by the Slovaks and by MECHEM are converted to 
estimates of areas cleared (m2)85 and combined with those given for area clearance. 
The total costs of both Slovaks and MECHEM are then used to calculate costs per m2. 
To compare full year periods, clearance data for January-December 2003 is used for 
the Slovaks (who departed mid-2004), while October 2003 – September 2004 are 
used for MECHEM (which started operations in September 2003). The intermediate 
calculations are: 
 
 km m2 (Roads) m2 Other Total m2 
Slovaks (2003) 91 637,000 1,120,740 1,757,740 
MECHEM (2003-04) 2,156 15,092,000 0 15,092,000 
 
The cost-effectiveness calculations are then: 
                                            
85 Road width averaged 7 meters (e-mail from D. Bax to J. Dirscherl, dated 9 December 
2004). Therefore, 1 km or road is estimated as 7 meters * 1000 meters = 7,000 m2. 




Table 12 – Cost-Effectiveness Calculations for Road Clearance 
 km or m2 $ $/unit Ratio 
Best case: 
Slovaks (2003) 91 km $2,324,443 $25,543 
MECHEM (2003-04) 2,156 km $1,568,371 $727 35.12:1 
Worst case: 
Slovaks (2003) 1,757,740 $10,522,201 $5.99 
MECHEM (2003-04) 15,092,000 $1,568,371 $0.10 57.62:1 
Notes: Area cleared figures from IMSMA (file Copy of Statstics_2003-2004.xls) 
Cost figures for Slovaks from data in memo ‘Possibility of purchasing Slovak COE’ by Sergiy 
Mazurov, with minor re-calculations by T. Paterson, and from the MOU for the Slovaks. 




1. The Slovak road clearance machines (tanks and rollers) are not IMAS 
compliant, but the combined assets deployed by MECHEM are. Safety for 
deminers, peacekeeping troops, and civilian populations is likely to be higher 
for roads surveyed and cleared by MECHEM. Roads “cleared” by the Slovak 
contingents may have to be re-cleared for full civilian use. 
2. Slovak forces have military capabilities. 
 








Measured by square metres










Road Clearance 'Best Case'
 
Valuing Military Capabilities 
 
To this point, we have referred to military capabilities as an intangible benefit 
associated with military demining units. However, the TCCs are paid for their 
personnel and equipment and, assuming this payment is a reasonable reflection of the 
value of the military capabilities, this would allow us to make a concrete estimate of 
the value of this ‘intangible’. Reviewing the MOUs in detail and deducting the 
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equipment useful only for demining allows us to generate the following estimates (in 
millions of dollars per year): 
 
Table 13 – Valuing Military Capabilities 
Total cost of Force demining units   $18.6 m 
Less: specialised demining equipment -$2.3 m 
Cost of military capabilities $16.3 m 
Savings (for paying civilian deminers) $2.3 m 
 
Thus, it would be wrong to conclude that the primary benefit from replacing military 
demining units with commercial demining firms will be a reduction in the total costs 
of UNMEE operations. If the troops in the demining units were, for example, infantry 
without specialised equipment, the reimbursement from the UN to the TCCs would 
still be in the neighbourhood of $16.3 million per annum. Thus, the principal benefits 
of using commercial demining firms are: (i) higher productivity, (ii) clearance to 




In Eritrea, military demining assets have been between 25 and 60 times more 
expensive than civilian86 demining assets from the perspective of the areas surveyed 
and cleared. In addition, civilian assets have been working to higher standards of 
quality and safety than have most of the military demining units available to UNMEE 
to this point in time.   
 
Military demining units embody both demining capacities and military capacities. 
This same set of capacities could be provided at less expense by (i) civilian demining 
assets coupled with (ii) conventionally equipped combat and support units from 
TCCs. In addition, UNMEE would benefit because far more roads and dangerous 
areas would be cleared, and to higher standards. Civilians who will also use those 
roads and areas will similarly benefit.  
 
9.2 Effectiveness of UNOPS as Executing Agency 
 
One of the subordinate objectives listed in the TORs was to: 
 
Review the performance of UNOPS as Executing Agency and its effectiveness in 
providing substantive and management services as well as administrative and 
financial support. 
 
The evaluation team did not have the time to conduct the kind of detailed analysis of 
the performance of UNOPS that would be necessary for an authoritative response to 
whether the agency provides services in a cost-effective manner – a question which 
would require a comparison with other organisations discharging similar 
                                            
86 The data available do not allow a direct comparison of different categories of civilian 
demining organisations – commercial firms versus not-for-profit NGOs. Therefore, we use the 
generic term ‘civilian’.  
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responsibilities or, at the very least, a comparison with performance benchmarks 
which do not, to our knowledge, exist. 
 
Our investigations do, however, support the following conclusions: 
  
• The UNOPS mandate, policies, and procedures allow it to respond more 
flexibly – including by contracting specialised assets & expertise from civilian 
organisations – than DPKO, which must deal with sometimes quixotic 
Security Council resolutions and mobilise resources through complex 
negotiations with TCCs;  
• UNOPS has extensive experience in supporting mine action programmes for 
both UNMAS and UNDP, and has developed a large roster, a variety of 
specialised policies and procedures, administrative aids, etc.;  
• UNOPS has played a key role in overall management of the programme, 
including technical, contractual, financial and administrative support; 
• In reviewing the role of UNOPS with respect to identification, selection and 
recruitment of personnel, the evaluation team considered that good judgement 
had prevailed; 
• Drawing upon its specialised experience, UNOPS has been able to identify 
and contract appropriate assets for the principal demining challenge facing the 
Force (road survey and clearance); 
• When performance requirements changed for a commercial demining firm, 
UNOPS took appropriate action and engaged a second firm using appropriate 
and efficient tendering procedures. The performance of the second firm has 
been most satisfactory; 
• While the evaluation did not entail a management audit which would allow us 
to pronounce more fully on the efficiency & effectiveness of UNOPS relative 
to other organisations providing project management support services in 
complex environments, the evaluation team found no evidence of errors, 
omissions, or unwarranted delays on the part of UNOPS which have 




In light of the conclusions drawn concerning civilian versus military assets and the 
capacities and performance on UNOPS, the following recommendation is proffered: 
 
DPKO should actively consider using non-military resources – engaged through 
UNOPS when appropriate – in support of its security council mandates, 
particularly when:  
• A specific role or task is well defined (including quality standards) and 
can be used as the basis for a contract with clear performance 
specifications;  
• Civilian organisations have more appropriate equipment, procedures, 
and/or experience for that role or task; 
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Chapter 10 – Conclusions, Recommendations and 
Lessons Learned 
 
We may identify two defining moments in the unfolding of UNMEE MACC’s 
programme: (i) the initial Security Council Resolution of the year 2000 allowing the 
MACC to become active in coordinating humanitarian mine action, a mandate so 
imprecise that the scope of work was only limited by one’s own creativity; and (ii) the 
President’s Proclamation 123 of mid-2002 with the effect of drastically confining the 
role of UNMEE MACC to activities in support of the Force only.  
 
The ambiguous mandate of the MACC stemming from the first Security Council 
Resolution led to a liberal interpretation of activities, and the first two years were 
characterized by a fast pace of work, under competent management, that included 
institutional development tasks. Unfortunately, the MACC did not succeed in 
coordinating demining in the TSZ, a task that can only be properly exercised given a 
number of pre-conditions that were not there, including a clearly defined appreciation 
of the mandate, and a good understanding of contamination. The fact that the mandate 
was not backed up by explicit concurrence at the highest level, as well as an outline of 
strategy accompanied by a definition of detailed roles and responsibilities right at the 
start, made the mandate unsustainable. The fluid and unpredictable political sentiment 
in the country was a serious complicating factor. 
 
The President’s Proclamation 123, effectively curtailing the mandate, forced the 
MACC to re-invent itself with respect to both its role and its management structure. 
From the point of view of management, the Proclamation was perhaps a blessing in 
disguise. It resulted in an integrated structure combining FMAC and UNMACC 
management under one roof without diminishing the Force Commander’s authority. 
The innovative idea won the UN 21 award, and can be applied to similar situations 
elsewhere with good benefit. With respect to operations, however, the MACC’s role 
was seriously diminished. Its capacity-building work became confined to supporting 
the new Eritrean Demining Authority in the field of information technology and 
medical support.   
 
As is evident from the Force’s QIP programme, there is a close congruence between 
the needs of the communities and the needs of the Force (as part of Mission 
requirements), if only to build good relations with one another. This is especially 
relevant after a state of emergency has transformed itself into a state of stability. The 
currently confined mandate of the UNMEE MACC has significant scope for 
enhancement by prioritising demining tasks in such a way that important secondary 
benefits accrue to the population. 
 
The MACC currently presents noteworthy strengths: a close management connection 
to the troops sharing a common command structure that could serve as an example 
elsewhere, MRE integrated into clearance priorities, a map production capability that 
is state of the art, a very useful database system (the latter still in need of 
improvement, however), stability of staff, and good programme management willing 
to look ahead particularly in terms of the need for alternative demining assets.  
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Yet, there remain significant challenges. Sensitivity to a volatile political climate is 
constantly required. The currently limited mandate can generally be enhanced only by 
acknowledging political realities, and acquiring the concurrence of national 
authorities. The MACC is staffed with competent individuals, but with a restricted 
mandate there seems to be over-capacity. Staff economies of scale are exceedingly 
low compared to the situation in, say, Afghanistan where a relatively modest number 
of international staff manages a very large number of deminers. 
 
Of greatest concern is the low productivity of demining contingents, the 
inappropriateness of mechanical devices employed, and the lack of sufficient mine 
action standards exhibited by at least one contingent, the Bangladeshis. Evidence 
strongly suggests the need for prior agreement on the type and quality of demining 
assets before the deployment of demining contingents, and the insistence on prior 
training in order that international mine action standards be introduced and 
maintained. 
 
The deployment of commercial demining assets has proven to be very cost-effective 
considering their relatively modest costs and high productivity. The introduction of 
some complementary commercial demining assets should be contemplated at the very 
start of a peacekeeping mission, and certainly when a phase of stability has been 
reached.   
 
A summary of recommendations and lessons learned is offered below. 
Recommendations – UNMEE MACC Specific 
 
It is recommended that UNMEE MACC prepare a costed proposal for the 
further enhancement of its mine action activities that would accomplish the 
three-fold objective of force protection, force mobility and community support 
designed to gain the goodwill of the population.87 
 
It is recommended to re-examine UNMEE MACC staffing options, including 
further staffing amalgamation options, and define a mine action programme that 
would enhance current activities by ensuring: (i) the satisfaction of military 
requirements; and (ii) the satisfaction of community aspirations in line with 
Force or Mission objectives. 
 
In spite of important recent upgrades that now allow the IMSMA system to 
operate relatively smoothly, work still needs to be done to resolve remaining 
technical problems, with particular emphasis on removing remaining ‘add-ons’, 
and facilitating ease of access by significantly simplifying the system. 
 
                                            
87 Subsequent to the evaluation mission, UNMAS and UNOPS contracted commercial 
organisations to provide mechanical and EDD assets in support of the Kenyan demining 
contingent, creating a combined commercial-military capacity. This is termed the Integrated 
Demining Contract (IDC), and is in line with our recommendation. More generally, we 
encourage UNMAS to update its analysis of the capacities required to meet the Force 
Commander’s objectives on a periodic basis, and give active consideration to alternative 
means for providing the requisite capacities in the most cost-effective manner. 
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Additional efforts will have to be made for handover of IMSMA expertise to the 
national authorities (EDA), an effort that requires full EDA participation 
(especially the recruitment and training of an IT specialist) and continued close 
cooperation between UNMEE MACC and UNDP. 
 
Recommendations – General 
 
Any involvement of a peacekeeping mission, or an entity closely associated with a 
peacekeeping mission, to support building of indigenous mine action capacity, 
should generally be contemplated with a full understanding and consideration of 
the consequences. Such involvement should be subject to a clear and 
unambiguous agreement between the UN and the Government at the highest 
level identifying mutual commitments and responsibilities.  
 
It is recommended that, in defining the mandate of a civilian mine action 
coordination centre attached to a peacekeeping mission, considerable effort be 
made to outline, for Security Council deliberations, the precise scope of the 
MACC's  responsibilities within the evolving context of political, humanitarian 
and peacekeeping realities, and in line with the MACC’s comparative advantage. 
 
It is recommended that the mandate of a civilian Mine Action Coordination 
Centre within a peacekeeping mission be enhanced by tying it very closely to the 
objectives of the Peacekeeping Mission itself, necessitating a careful analysis of 
ways in which the MACC can satisfy basic aspirations of the people in the region 
in line with the Force’s goals. 
 
UNMAS should be actively involved in the planning for peacekeeping missions, 
including the definition of mission requirements, and work with the Force-
generating unit in areas of equipment planning and establishment of standards. 
 
Mission requirements should be reviewed on an agreed basis and schedule to 
assess whether comparative advantages between military/commercial/civilian 
mine action entities have shifted. 
 
A MOU with a TCC covering the operation of a demining contingent should 
include the authority of a MACC to ensure IMAS compatibility. 
 
A Joint Assessment Mission should include a highly experienced mine action 
specialist thoroughly familiar with force demining requirements as well as 
demining in accordance with IMAS. The specialist should also have a sound 
knowledge of all demining technologies available and their appropriate 
application. DPKO may have to fall back on external expertise to cover the 
whole range of aspects. 
 
The need for a judicious mix of demining assets will need to be anticipated right 
at the start of the mission, based on:  
 
i. a clear definition of tasks expected to be performed, combined with a 
liberal rather than a narrow interpretation of the Security Council 
Final, August 2005 
72 
Resolution defining the mandate (see also above recommendation calling 
for a substantially enhanced definition of mandate);  
ii. the realization that there is a considerable dual benefit of demining 
accruing to both the Mission and the affected communities; and  
iii. the significant scope that exists to supplement and/or complement 
traditional contingent demining assets with commercial demining assets. 
 
DPKO needs to institutionalise the authority and competence to negotiate with 
TCC in order to ensure the best contribution suited to circumstances. UNMAS 
could play an important role in this respect. 
 
The Assessed Budget should include a well-considered mix of expenditures that 
takes into account the natural unfolding of demining activities that normally 
change significantly when the mission moves from an emergency state to a state 
of stability.  
 
Military demining assets offered by TCCs have to be assessed accurately prior 
their deployment with the prospect of their potential utilization, clearance 
performance, suitability for the particular environment and cost-effectiveness.  
 
DPKO should arrange for a review of the use of the assets deployed to a mission 
after one year aiming to do adjustments, if necessary.  
 
The potential advantage of commercial assets should be taken into consideration 
from the beginning of a mission if the security situation allows. 
 
Demining staff intended to be used in the UN area of responsibility must be 
trained, prior to deployment, to apply international mine action standards.  
 
UNMAS may wish to consider quality assuring existing regional mine action 
training centres for future training purposes of TCC contingents. 
 
Donors may have to be requested to contribute equipment and training to 
compensate for second rate demining assets belonging to demining contingents. 
 
DPKO should actively consider using non-military resources – engaged through 
UNOPS when appropriate – in support of its security council mandates, 
particularly when:  
• A specific role or task is well defined (including quality standards) and 
can be used as the basis for a contract with clear performance 
specifications;  
• Civilian organisations have more appropriate equipment, procedures, 
and/or experience for that role or task; 









The integration of civil and military mine action assets under a joint mine action 
structure, fully respecting Force authority, is an efficient and effective way to 
plan and execute a mine action response.   
 
The revised MACC work plan was a creative and appropriate response to the 
unexpected and drastic decisions of the Eritrean Government in mid-2002. It 
resulted, in fact, in increased efficiency of UNMEE MACC operations by 
integrating military demining assets into a civilian-run mine action centre.  
 
Capacity development support by a specialized agency with a relevant core 
mandate, should start immediately after cessation of hostility and the arrival of a 
peacekeeping force, not two years later. 
 
Mine action must have national ownership to be successful and sustainable. This 
also infers that demining should be included in national development plans as a 
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Annex 1 – Terms of Reference 





Based on Security Council Resolution 1320 of 15 September 2000, the United 
Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), through the United Nations Mine 
Action Service (UNMAS) and the United Nations Office for Project Services 
(UNOPS), established a Mine Action Programme responsible for the UN established 
Temporary Security Zone (TSZ) along the disputed border between Ethiopia and 
Eritrea and in areas adjacent to the TSZ. The aim was to provide coordination and 
technical assistance for humanitarian mine action within the TSZ and areas adjacent. 
To that end, the UNMEE Mine Action Co-ordination Centre (MACC) was established 
in Asmara.  
 
The programme was initiated in late 2000. Soon after beginning its coordination 
function with three international and one national non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), a bi-laterally funded international contractor and the UNMEE force 
demining assets as implementers, the MACC began working with the Eritrean 
government to build a national mine action programme. In response to an increasing 
number of anti-tank mines planted on roads in the TSZ, the MACC added a 
mechanical route clearance contractor under its direct tasking. The national NGO for 
mine action and the Eritrean Mine Action Programme (EMAP), though never 
formally incorporated by the government, was supported by the MACC and later 
additional assistance was provided by the UNDP mine action capacity building 
programme starting in early 2002. The support to EMAP came to an end in July 2002 
with the issuance of Presidential decree 123/2002 that established the Eritrean 
Demining Authority (EDA). The decree meant the dissolution of EMAP and all 
cooperative agreements it had signed. In August of the same year, the government 
issued a letter to all mine action NGOs to cease operations in Eritrea. All but HALO 
Trust terminated activities in 2002, though HALO was eventually asked to leave and 
did so in June 2003.  
 
With the end of EMAP and direct assistance to the Eritrean Government, the MACC 
concentrated on mandated activities in support of the peacekeeping mission. The 
UNMEE mandate for mine action was expanded through Resolution 1430 adopted on 
14 August 2002 to provide demining in key areas to support the demarcation work of 
the Ethiopian Eritrean Boundary Commission (EEBC). The revised work plan 
implemented at the end if 2002 brought the force demining assets and command 
structure under the coordination of the MACC, an achievement that earned the 
MACC a UN 21 Award for increased team productivity in 2003. The work of the 
MACC related to the EEBC demarcation is currently suspended due to a political 
dispute between the two parties over portions of the proposed border. The MACC is 
currently overseeing a major shift in UNMEE demining assets with the repatriation of 
a mechanical contingent from Slovakia with a proposal to hire a commercial firm to 
fill that role. 
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The MACC recently under-went an internal audit performed by the resident OIOS 
auditors in UNMEE.  
 
Goals of the Evaluation  
 
The goals of the evaluation are:  
 
• Define the coordination role of the programme in Ethiopia and Eritrea through 
mid-2002  
• Define the optimal integration of peacekeeping force demining assets under a 
civilian-run coordination centre  
• Provide a cost benefit analysis of peacekeeping demining versus commercial 
demining in support of a security council mandate  
 
Objectives of the Evaluation  
 
The objectives of the evaluation are:  
 
• to evaluate the original build-up of the MACC, the organizational structure 
and its overall effectiveness as a coordination/oversight body;  
• to evaluate the implementation arrangements under which the MACC has 
operated and to determine the efficiency and effectiveness of this approach;  
• to evaluate the coordination role of the MACC from start-up through mnid-
2002 and assess its impact on mine action activities in Eritrea  
• to evaluate the revised work plan designed in late 2002 and its 
implementation, including the effectiveness of peacekeeping force demining 
assets under the MACC;  
• to assess the use of peacekeeping demining assets versus commercial assets 
including indicators of access, productivity, flexibility, cost and related 
factors;  
• to analyze the relationship with the UNDP Eritrea Mine Action Capacity 
Building Programme with a focus on how the relationship has impacted UN 
coordination and humanitarian mine action in Eritrea;  
• to determine how the donors that support mine action in Ethiopia and Eritrea 
evaluate the MACC and what, in their view, is the added value it offers;  
• to determine lessons learned and to make recommendations for the UN and 
international donors.  
• to comment on the future resource requirements of the MACC.  
 
Issues to be addressed:  
 
In order to achieve the objective of the evaluation the team members will address the 
following issues:  
 
Phases of peacekeeping mandated mine action in Ethiopia and Eritrea:  
 
• Review the sequence of events that led to the initiation of the programme and 
its development since;  
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• Assess the timeliness and effectiveness of the UN and international mine 
action response throughout the operation;  
• Assess the cooperation and coordination between the MACC, UNMEE HQ, 
other UN agencies, government bodies and NGO operators as the programme 
evolved; 
• Draw lessons for future emergency operations;  
 
Inputs versus outputs during the life of the programme:  
 
• Review the financial and human resource inputs and how they have changed with 
the real and perceived responsibilities of the MACC;  
• Evaluate the total real cost of UN supported assets and interventions and the 
results achieved for each;  
• Consider what alternate arrangements would have been feasible given the 
operating environment and how they would compare to the inputs used during the 
programme.  
 
Current status of mine action in the TSZ and areas adjacent:  
 
• Review the operational requirements of the programme and the resources 
available and recommend any changes required to meet operational needs;  
• Review the implementation modalities of the programme and recommend what 
action should be taken for future programmes implemented under similar 
circumstances;  
 
Efficiency of project management arrangements:  
 
• Analyse the Programme's management role, resource mobilization role, 
coordination role, reporting, communications and planning, review the roles and 
responsibilities of the project manager and international contracted and in-kind 
experts;  
• Review MACC relation to bilaterally funded operators, bilateral contracts and 
terms supporting or complicating the MACC's coordination role;  
• Review the relationship with UNMEE to determine the effectiveness of 
Programme within the context of the larger UN Mission;  
• Evaluate the effectiveness of the IMSMA system and determine how it has 
contributed to the overall management of the mine action programme in Eritrea;  
• Review the performance of UNOPS as Executing Agency and its effectiveness in 
providing substantive and management services as well as administrative and 
financial support;  
• Review the performance of UNMAS in supporting the project in terms of resource 
mobilization and advocacy, management, and project implementation.  
 
Resource mobilization and donor support:  
 
• Assess the UNMAS and MACC roles as perceived by donors;  
• Assess the impact of the assessed budget funding on the implementation of the 
programme.  
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Programme results and achievements:  
 
• Determine to what extent the objectives and outputs outlined by the Programme 
have been met;  
• Comment on the effect of funding in terms of levels and timeliness during the 
duration of the programme; 
• Recommend what actions should be taken to ensure that the project objectives are 
met as planned for future mine action programmes;  
• Review project results with emphasis on Security Council mandates and longer-
term impact.  
 
The main stakeholders are:  
 
-  UNMAS 
-  UNMEE 
-  UNOPS  
-  Ethiopia Eritrea Boundary Commission (EEBC)  
-  Eritrean Demining Authority (EDA);  
-  Ethiopian Mine Action Office (EMAO);  
- Mine Action organisations operators in Eritrea and Ethiopia (i.e. International NGO            
and commercial companies);  
-  International community as donors  
-  UNDP  
-  UNICEF  
-  Eritrean Commission for Coordination with the Peacekeeping Mission (CCPM);  
-  Eritrean Resettlement and Rehabilitation Commission (ERRC);  
-  Population in mine affected areas;  
 
Scope of the Evaluation  
 
The team should consider the primary objectives and outputs for the phases as stated 
by the original Strategy document, work Plan 2002 and work Plan 2004 in the context 
of all aspects of an integrated mine action programme: mine awareness, mine 
information, training, surveys and minefield marking; mine clearance; victim 
assistance and rehabilitation, quality management, accreditation and tasking 
procedures.  
 
Methodology of the Evaluation Team  
 
The evaluation team will (in New York):  
 
• Be briefed by the UNMAS and UNOPS immediately upon arrival to New 
York. A series of meetings will be organized with UNDP, UNICEF, UNOPS 
etc.  
• Compile documentation for review such as the Strategy, concept of operations, 
progress reports, monthly reports, etc  
 
The evaluation team will (in Eritrea):  
 
Final, August 2005 
79 
• Conduct interviews with major stakeholders, including the UN Mission in 
Ethiopia and Eritrea, UNDP, UNICEF, Ethiopia Eritrea Boundary 
Commission (EEBC), Eritrean Demining Authority (EDA), CCPM, 
representatives of major donor contributing countries, clearance NGO (EDO), 
commercial companies, etc  
• Conduct targeted field visits to verify Programme plans and implementation of 
priorities in accordance with international standards and to identify further 
needs for assistance if any  
• Have discussions with staff involved in program implementation  
• The MACC will facilitate and coordinate a schedule of meetings for the 
evaluation team, provide logistics and support for gathering the information.  
 
The evaluation team will (in Donor Capitals):  
 
• Conduct interviews with donor agencies to determine the rationale and 
expectations  
• review funding decisions to the MACC  
• assess the outlook for future funding for the MACC and mine-action in 
general in Eritrea and Ethiopia  
• Have discussions with representatives of NGO implementers where possible 
to collect relevant information on MACC-NGO coordination (most former 
operators no longer operate or have representatives in Eritrea).  
 
Evaluation Team  
 
The Evaluation team will be composed of two independent consultants (experts) of 
whom one will focus on questions of organizational design and management, and the 
other will focus on technical aspects of the mine action activities. The team should 
offer a broad range of experience and skills offering both UN and NGO perspectives.  
 
UNMAS will assume the role of managing the evaluation exercise, working closely 
with the members of the evaluation team to ensure effective monitoring of the 
exercise and concurrence with the objectives as defined by the TOR.  
 
Time Frame and Conclusions of the Mission  
 
The Evaluation Mission is planned to take place from September to November 2004. 
The total duration of the mission is eight weeks. One week prior to deployment in 
New York, four to five weeks in Eritrea and Ethiopia, up to two weeks visiting key 
donor capitals and two weeks drafting the report. 
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Annex 2 – MACBP Key Milestones88 
 
 
Feb-02  CTA MACBP arrives 
  Formation of UNDP advisory team initiated (CTA, TA, VA, LIS) 
 
Mar-02 STA LIS arrives 
 
Apr-02  Original MACBP Project Document signed, includes only 
- LIS 
- EDA500 K equipment for old EDA 
- Some assistance to EMAP headquarters 
- Remainder of programme vested with UNMEE MACC and NGOs 
Project Cooperation Agreement UNDP and UNOPS 
Project Cooperation Agreement UNDP and EMAP 
TA LIS and TA AFL (LIS) arrive 
Equipment for LIS, EMAP, VA ordered. 
 
May-02 LIS national staff selected 
  Capacity building in EMAP initiated in MACC Departments 
 
Jul-02 Proclamation 123 published to establish the Eritrean Demining 
Authority  
  EMAP and old EDA cease operations 
  MAT, DDG, DCA expelled   
 
Sep-02  ESCA engaged as partner for Implementation of LIS 
 
Oct-02  GM EDA appointed 
  TA Victim Assistance arrives 
 
Dec-02 Initial MACBP project document fully funded (approx US $3m) 
  Staff assembled for EDA/EDO 
  Assisted UNMAS with production of UN policy for VA 
 
Jan-03  MACBP leases office accommodation for EDA/EDO 
  VA training initiated to identify priorities 
 
Feb-03  GM certifies EDA/EDO conduct in compliance with IMAS  
  Interim Strategic Framework Drafted 
 
Mar-03 EDA/EDO office equipment installed 
  Computer training and English classes initiated 
Proposal for analysis of national survey for people with disability 
developed 
 
                                            
88 Verbatim from MACBP document 
Final, August 2005 
82 
Apr-03 Prodoc revision initiated (to include new activities affordable within 
existing budget (e.g. TAs) 
Equipment ordered for EDA read only database 
Equipment ordered for disability survey analysis 
Briefings initiated with EU and Norwegians 
MOU initiated between HAL and EDO 
Minister of Labour and Human Welfare endorses Direction Paper in 
Victim Support 
 
May-03 Field equipment starts to be transferred from MACC to EDO 
  Agreement with MACC/SRSA to share IMSMA officer 
  Approval for TAs Ops and Field Ops; recruiting initiated 
 
Jun-03  First intervention in Strategic Planning by Cranfield University 
  LIS TA departs; LIS management restructured, new TA arrives 
  HALO departure directed 
 
Jul-03  Revised programme document for three years submitted for approval 
  TA field Ops arrives 
  LIS operations review, 2nd QA complete 
  EDA deputy director attends Cranfield Senior Management course 
  LIS evaluation by EU 
 
Aug-02  TA Ops arrives 
  LIS restructured, increased production by 30% 
  Six MRE teams complete refresher training 
  UNICEF Project Cooperation Agreement in MRE 
 
Dec-03 3 x MCT accredited and commence operations 
  MAP 04 launched at Open House 
  EDA QA team commences operations 
 
Jan-04  Refresher training conducted for operational teams 
  RONCO MDDT integrate ops with EDO teams 
 
Mar-04 Equipment ordered for 2x20 deminer MCTs and 2xEOD 
 
Jun-04  LIS completed 
 
Jul-04  Training commenced for new MCTs 
  Prodoc approved 
  Emergency Access order sent to UNOPS 
  Implementation national survey (disability) analysis underway 
 
Aug-04 PWC mission completed 
  Appraisal completed 
  Draft National Strategic Plan completed 
  Draft Article 5 completed 
 
Sep-04  Article 7 update submitted 
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  New team training completed, preparing for accreditation 
  PCA for emergency access approved 
  Workshop studies Integrated Community Approach 
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Source: MBZ, Netherlands (Norway has additional contributions not reflected here for 2002 
and 2003.) 
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Map of Shilalo 
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